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A series of experiments examined both the phenomenological nature and centrality of 
Cognitive Control in common cognitive paradigms.  This was done primarily by 
employing manipulations of Congruency Proportion (CP), which are thought to modulate 
key aspects of Cognitive Control.  Experiment 1 leads this investigation by examining the 
degree to which participants are consciously aware of the influence of CP in the Simon 
task.  Here, it was observed that participants’ subjective reports of the proportion of 
congruent trials did not predict their actual CP effects, suggesting a non-conscious locus of 
CP effects.  Experiments 2 and 3 followed up these preliminary findings by assessing the 
degree to which CP effects differentially modulate the application of Cognitive Control in 
two variants of the size congruity paradigm (Numerical Judgement and Physical 
Judgement).  Here, I found that manipulations of CP significantly impacted the Numerical 
Judgement task, but not the Physical Judgement task, and thus seriously challenge the 
notion of a central and unitary Cognitive Control module.  In Experiment 4, I assessed the 
systematic variation (via correlations) of effects from the size congruity paradigm and the 
Stroop task across blocks of trials at different levels of CP.  In addition, I examined the 
degree to which the effects of CP were related to common self report measures of 
Cognitive Control (the Need for Cognition scale and Cognitive Failures Questionnaire).  
The pattern of within-task and between-task reliabilities was examined to elucidate the 
degree to which there is a common central control component that governs behaviour in all 
tasks.  There was surprisingly little to no relation among the CP effects observed in these 
three tasks.  In addition, neither participants’ engagement with the task (as indexed by the 
iv 
Need for Cognition Scale), nor their propensity to have attentional slips (as indexed by the 
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire) predicted their performance in any way.  Taken 
together, this set of experiments has seriously undermined the received view that CP 
effects arise from a central and unitary form of conscious control. These results are 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“A final factor that may serve to our belief in direct introspective awareness is motivation.  
It is naturally preferable, from the standpoint of prediction and subjective feelings of 
control, to believe that we have such access.  It is frightening to believe that one has no 
more certain knowledge of the working of one's own mind than would an outsider with 
intimate knowledge of the workings of one's history and of the stimuli present at the time 
the cognitive process occurred.”  Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
 
 The idea of being the sovereign ruler over our own motivations and goals is 
ubiquitous throughout psychological research.  This is perhaps especially true in the more 
narrow definitions within Cognitive Psychology, in which we use the terms “cognitive 
control”,  “response selection”, and “selective attention”, and thus make personal goals 
seem more manageable and testable.  The idea of control has been around since the very 
earliest days of psychological research.  Then as now, the idea of control has been tied to 
attentional processes and consciousness (Baldwin, 1901; Angell, 1907).  In the current 
widely accepted view, and contrary to some earlier conceptions going back to Wilhelm 
Wundt, Cognitive Control is not a higher order mechanism that is unavailable to strict 
laboratory tests.  Rather, Cognitive Control is viewed as an integral part of many cognitive 
phenomena.  Because of the widespread use of the idea of control throughout a number of 
differing lines of research, it is quite difficult to find a clear history of the evolution of the 
current concept of Cognitive Control. Two of the earliest and most popular areas of 
research, in which control was a central component, were individual differences and 
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memory.  While these two different major areas of research did not cross reference each 
other for the most part, it is interesting to see the commonalities between them in their use 
of language.  As such, it is perhaps useful to briefly describe the development of the 
construct of Cognitive Control through these different lines of research. 
Control as an Individual Difference 
 Some of the earliest conceptions of Cognitive Control were considered only as an 
individual differences variable, more similar to a static personality trait than a dynamic 
resource.  While intuitively backwards from how the cognitive literature currently uses the 
term, Klein (1956), and Gardner and colleagues (e.g., Gardner, 1959; Gardner & Long, 
1960) defined certain individual consistencies in cognitive behaviour which have many 
similarities to modern conceptions of control.  These ideas were used to create individual 
cognitive “styles” that ranged on a number of different dimensions.  For example, one 
dimension of Cognitive Control was “Field Articulation", which could be defined as the 
ability to selectively attend to parts of a visual display while ignoring other less pertinent 
parts in a visual estimation task.  Thus, even though control was conceptualized as a trait 
level phenomenon, it was a way in which individuals exerted top-down influences on task 
performance. 
 Many of the constructs of Cognitive Control were of interest to those studying 
clinical phenomenon, such as Schizophrenia (e.g., McKinnon & Singer, 1969; Schooler & 
Silverman, 1969), as well as social phenomenon, such as Cognitive Dissonance (Wolitzky, 
1967).  Around the same time (late 1960’s), researchers began to examine the influence of 
Cognitive Control on more basic cognitive processes, such as Stroop performance (Grand, 
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1968), and attention (Wachtel, 1967).  The earliest examples of Cognitive Control being 
conceptualized as a process, or dynamic variable, however, are not seen until the early 
1970s.  Hammond and Summers (1972) were some of the first to articulate these concepts 
in line with our current understanding of Cognitive Control as being a measurable variable 
that can change as a function of task.  This is a clear departure from earlier conceptions, 
where Cognitive Control was viewed more as a static individual difference.  Specifically, 
Hammond and Summers suggest that Cognitive Control is a necessary component of 
behaviour and one that will influence performance in a wide range of tasks.  Most 
importantly, they argue that Cognitive Control is not only measurable, but can be 
experimentally manipulated.  Similarly, Furedy (1973) argued that Cognitive Control must 
be measured more systematically, so as to better understand the relation of Cognitive 
Control to “autonomic” responses, or in today's parlance, “automatic” responses.  This 
shift in emphasis from an individual trait to a process open to manipulation and systematic 
measurement is an important one.  It is hard to judge the impact of this line of research on 
current work as it is not independent of other investigations from around the same time that 
deal with the workings of control.  In the end, however, this later sentiment would have a 
profound impact on current research and theoretical developments. 
Control and Memory 
 In the first two-store memory model of Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968), control 
appears as a transient component of memory rather than a permanent structure.  Given this, 
Cognitive Control would then be best conceptualized as a conscious effortful phenomenon 
under the control of the individual.  In a sense, it was not explicitly part of their model at 
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all.  Here we see an early example of what will become a common modeling trend.  
Control in essence, in many models, is a free parameter to help explain the complexity of 
human behavior.  In some cases control could even be considered a crutch, something to be 
leaned on whenever behavioral patterns become too complicated to model explicitly. 
 In a related trend, Cognitive Control began to be slightly more defined, while still  
maintaining its amorphous nature.  For example, shortly after Atkinson and Shiffrin’s 
Modal Model, Baddeley and Hitch (1974), developed what has become perhaps one of the 
most influential models of short-term memory, the Working Memory Model. In their 
model, Cognitive Control featured prominently in the “Central Executive” module, which 
was, in essence, a limited capacity attentional controller.  This model set the tone for many 
future iterations of Cognitive Control as a means of directing attention.  Implications of 
this model can be seen throughout many different areas of cognitive research. 
 One further profound impact of the idea of control on memory research, is the 
development of the concept of inhibition.  Inhibition has a great deal of intuitive appeal 
when thinking about control.  In essence, inhibition is a specific type of control, wherein a 
mental process (or a component of a mental process) is stopped or attenuated.  This idea 
has had a huge impact through a number of current research paradigms, including negative 
priming (see Tipper, 2001, for a review), and directed forgetting (see MacLeod, 1998, for a 
review).  Inhibition also has had a continuing impact, whether explicitly stated or 
implicitly apparent in the model, in current Cognitive Control research. 
Control and Automaticity 
 Parallel to the development of notions of Cognitive Control in research and theory 
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in memory, researchers began to appreciate its potential role in a wide variety of cognitive 
tasks.  Specifically, the concept of Cognitive Control became important to the study of 
word reading (Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975), inhibition in go-nogo paradigms 
(Logan & Cowan, 1984), and studies of slips of attention (Reason, 1979; Norman, 1981). 
Central to much of these varied fields of research is the dichotomy between controlled 
versus automatic processes.  The idea of two types of processes was first expressed more 
than a century ago (James, 1890) but only became heavily influential after the seminal 
work of Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) and Schneider and Shiffrin (1977).  Influenced by 
work on memory and attention (see Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963), 
Shiffrin and Schneider laid out the fundamental properties of these two types of processes:  
controlled processes are very resource dependent, slow, and flexible, whereas automatic 
processes are resource independent, fast, and inflexible.  Of note, Schneider and Shiffrin 
(1977) suggested that when an automatic process is initialized, it will enter the short-term 
store (working/short-term memory) but need not be brought to conscious attention.  By 
contrast, controlled processes are activated only with the attention of the individual, and 
require attention to be maintained.  It is widely accepted that most complex behaviours 
arise from an interplay between these two types of processes, but how these two processes 
interact is still debated.  Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) suggested that both processes 
(automatic and controlled) could run in parallel and then a further controlled process would 
be needed to utilize the outputs of these two processes.   
 Whereas attention is postulated to be required for a controlled process, not all 
controlled processes are posited to be made available to consciousness.  Thus, attention 
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and consciousness are not synonymous.  Additionally, like many others before and since, 
Schneider and Shiffrin also found it difficult to keep clear the concepts of controlled 
processes and Cognitive Control, despite listing one of their seven principles as being that 
Cognitive Control could exert a larger influence over controlled processes than automatic 
ones (the evidence of this being obtained from examples including the Stroop task).   
The Stroop Task and Cognitive Control 
 Stroop (1935) was the first to describe a phenomenon which would later become a 
central means of exploring the interplay between controlled and automatic processes.  
When a colour word (e.g., "red") is presented in a print colour (e.g., red or blue), subjects 
are faster and more accurate to identify the colour when the word is congruent with the 
print colour ("red" presented in red print) than when the word is incongruent with the print 
colour ("red" presented in blue print).  This is commonly referred to as the Stroop effect 
and is one of the most robust phenomenon in the cognitive literature (see MacLeod, 1991, 
for review).    
 The Stroop effect is widely believed to reflect the automatic processing of the 
colour word:  
 
“the automatization of word recognition allows much quicker reading... but 
also leaves us vulnerable to the Stroop effect... knowing about this effect is 
no protection -- the processes are not open to control.” Reisberg (1997), p. 
603.  
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Thus, in the view of Shiffrin and Schneider (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Schneider & 
Shiffrin, 1977) the controlled process of colour naming would be more open to Cognitive 
Control than the automatic process of word reading.  Put in terms of inhibition, in order to 
correctly name the colour the word is printed in, the individual must inhibit the word 
reading process.  The first test of this came soon after, albeit with a different task.   
 Using a “Stroop-like” task, Logan and Zbrodoff (1979) tested the extent to which 
automatic and controlled processes were influenced by strategic (or cognitive) control.  
Instead of colour words displayed in congruent or incongruent colours, they used the 
words ABOVE and BELOW printed above or below a central fixation.  Interestingly, 
although word reading is taken to be automatic with the standard Stroop task being cited as 
evidence (Reisberg, 1997), indicating the physical location is the faster and more fluent 
process, whereas identifying the word is thought to be the slower, less fluent process.  
Logan and Zbrodoff manipulated the expectation of conflicting trials by varying the 
proportion of trials in different conditions. They did this by including conditions with a 
low proportion of congruent trials (10%, 20%, and 40%) and conditions with a high 
proportion of congruent trials (60%, 80%, and 90%).  A double dissociation was found; as 
the number of congruent trials increased, the size of the “Stroop” effect increased, and as 
the number of congruent trials decreased, the “Stroop” effect reversed in direction.  This 
manipulation revealed two major findings.  First, the more fluent process of identifying the 
location of the word and the less fluent process of identifying the word were both subject 
to “strategic” influences.  Second, the extent to which “strategic” influences impacted the 
component processes was modulated not only by the extremity of the proportion of the 
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congruent trials, but also, and more importantly, by the relative fluency of the component 
process.  Thus (in Logan and Zbrodoff's terms) the automatic process of localization was 
less open to selective attentional processes (or Cognitive Control) than the attentional 
process of word reading.   
 Subsequently, the influence of Cognitive Control in the traditional colour word 
Stroop task was tested with similar results (Logan, Zbrodoff & Williamson, 1984).  This 
replication and extension showed the same pattern as Logan and Zbrodoff (1979) when 
two colour words were used (Experiments 1 and 2) but did not hold in the case of four 
colour words (Experiment 3).  The conclusion drawn from this research was that four 
colour words perhaps created too many contingencies to “keep in mind”.  This is an 
interesting conclusion to make, given that the manipulation of the proportion of congruent 
trials still modulated the size of the Stroop effect, even though there was no reversal of the 
effect.  
  It is worth pointing out here the language that is used to describe the nature of 
Cognitive Control.  In line with the Nisbett and Wilson (1977) quote above, there has 
always been an implicit assumption that Cognitive Control is a conscious willful 
component of our being.  Certainly, there is a clear implicit assumption that the 
manipulation of expectations is something that subjects are aware of, as the terms “keep in 
mind”, and “strategic” are replete throughout the literature.  This is a trend that has 
continued into later models and theories, and is of central concern to the current work.  As 
conceptions of Cognitive Control have grown and developed, is the construct still aptly 
named?  An additional problem is keeping distinct Cognitive Control from controlled 
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processes.  If controlled processes require attention and continuing conscious effort, how 
are they different from Cognitive Control? 
Current Views on Cognitive Control 
 One of the earliest and most influential examples of an explicit model of the Stroop 
paradigm brings to light a key issue: that tied up with the notion of Cognitive Control 
being a conscious component of our psyche, it is also thought to be a central and unitary 
one.  Cohen, Dunbar, and McClelland (1990) proposed an explicit model in which 
“Attentional Selection” nodes were used as a means to modulate the input of the 
component processes in the Stroop task: 
 
“We assume that this information is available as the output from some other 
module and results from encoding and interpreting the task instructions.  
Clearly, this is a highly flexible process and can adapt to the wide variety of 
information processing tasks that humans can perform”.  Cohen, Dunbar, and 
McClelland (1990), p. 338.   
 
Clearly, the assumption made here is one of control being a unitary process that is shared 
by many different tasks, and organized in such a way as to adapt itself to those different 
tasks.  Presumably then, the same selective attention mechanism could be used to perform 
a Stroop task as to perform a different task, for example, a cueing task (e.g., Risko & Stolz, 
2010). 
The current received view of Cognitive Control is based upon the work of 
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Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen (2001) who modified Cohen et al. (1990) to 
include a conflict monitoring node in order to account for Congruency Proportion (CP) 
effects, like those of Logan, Zbrodoff and Williamson described above (see Figure 1).  The 
complete set of mechanisms suggested by Botvinick and colleagues to account for 
implemented Cognitive Control is remarkably simple.  As the proportion of congruent 
trials decreases, there is more conflict at the response level.  As the conflict increases (see 
Eq. 1 in Figure 1), an error detector (the conflict monitoring node) signals the need for 
more top-down control.  Subsequently the task demand units are reinforced (see Eq. 2 in 
Figure 1).  Conversely, as the proportion of congruent trials increases, there is less conflict, 
and less need for top-down control.  To put it in more simple terms, the implication of a 
change in the proportion of congruent trials has two consequences: the task becomes more 
difficult or easier.  If the task becomes more difficult, subjects try harder to fulfill the task 
instructions, but if the task becomes easier, then the subjects try less.  Thus, in the Stroop 
task, when there are more congruent trials than incongruent trials, the putatively automatic 
process of word reading is relied upon more than the more controlled process of colour 
naming, as most of the time reading the word will generate the correct response. 
This leads to a pattern of data in which reaction times and error rates to incongruent 
trials increase as CP increases.  Interestingly, this is an example of a positive form of 
control rather than an inhibitory one.  Note that it would be equally easy to generate a 
model in which inhibitory control is utilized.  The above, however, is an existence proof of 
control with no need for inhibition. 
The mechanism suggested for error detection has been proposed to be localized in  








Figure 1. This graphical depiction of the model is from Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, 
and Cohen (2001).  Display Colour and Word units activate Response units.  The amount 
of conflict at the Response level is fed forward to the Conflict monitoring node (which is 
analogous to the Anterior Cingulate Cortex) which modulates control.  Control is 
represented in the Task Demand units which in turn modulates the Display Colour and 
Word units.     
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the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) of the brain.  A wide range of neuroimaging studies 
have found that when conflict is present, there is activation in the ACC (e.g., Ansari, 
Fugelsang, Dhital, & Venkatraman, 2006, in the size congruity paradigm; Swick & 
Jovanovic, 2002, in the Stroop Paradigm).  Botvinick et al. have therefore proposed a 
model in which a unitary control unit modulates activation in task units.  Explicitly in their 
model, control is a single and simple mechanism shared by all the task relevant nodes.  
Interestingly, the location of the activation “in” the ACC is widely variable (Botvinick, 
Cohen, & Carter, 2004).  In a number of meta analyses, the “error detector” is activated in 
a wide region outside the anatomical ACC (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000).  The diffusion of 
activation which is dependent on task does not undermine the conflict monitoring 
hypothesis.  It does however call into question the localization of the subsequent control 
purported to be recruited by the detection of conflict.  If the error detector is a diffuse and 
non-unitary mechanism, what is the nature of the subsequent “control” mechanism?  At a 
higher level of conception, how well does such a simple mechanism capture the nature of 
Cognitive Control?   
Despite the general acceptance of the view of Botvinick and colleagues, there are a 
number of works that call into question such a simple view of control.  The first was the 
finding that individual words and colours in the Stroop task could form distinct 
Congruency Proportions within the list wide set of Congruency Proportion.  For example, 
Jacoby, Lindsay and Hessels (2003) reported that within a list wide set of a CP of .50, 
some of the items could have a higher CP, and some a lower CP.  The resulting pattern of 
data showed a clear separation, such that the Stroop effect was larger for those items with a 
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high CP, and smaller for those items with a low CP.  In order to account for such a finding, 
clearly an additional mechanism, or a modification of the single mechanism already 
utilized, must be made to Botvinick et al.’s (2001) model.  Such a model was developed by 
Blais, Robidoux, Risko, and Besner (2007).  Blais et al. were able to account for the Item 
Specific Proportion Congruent Effect (or ISPC effect) by modifying the way the feedback 
from the conflict monitoring node influenced the pathways to the component processes.  
Rather than having a singular mechanism provide input to a complete component process, 
the Blais et al. model has the same singular mechanism provide feedback to each level of 
each component process (see Figure 2).  This simple theoretical adjustment allows the 
Blais et al. model to account for both the traditional (list-wide) CP effect, and the ISPC 
effect.   
Although the above “problem”, and the solution to that problem, of the account of 
Botvinick and colleagues is relatively straight forward, the trouble does not end there.  
While endorsing the Blais et al. model, Jacoby and colleagues (Bugg, Jacoby, & Toth, 
2008) have added another empirical finding that requires accommodation.  Extending their 
previous findings, they showed evidence for another level of CP effects within the Stroop 
task.  Specifically, by varying the font of some items, Bugg et al. (2008) demonstrated a 
font specific CP effect.  Bugg et al. argued that this suggests there are multiple levels of 
control within each task.  Such an argument, however, could make modeling a nightmare, 
as multiple levels of item specific CP may not be so easily accommodated.   
Perhaps (in part at least) in response to these findings, Braver, Gray, and Burgess  
 







Figure 2. This graphical depiction of the model is from Blais, Robidoux, Risko, and 
Besner (2007), which is a more clearly specified version of the model from Botvinick et al. 
(2001).  Note that it shares all the same components, but ACC connections are to the 
individual pathways and Task Demand units.  This implemented model has a much more 
integrated role for the ACC. 
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(2007) have suggested that Cognitive Control may in fact reflect two separate control 
mechanisms: Proactive Control, and Reactive Control.  Proactive Control is suggested to 
be a top-down, task demand and contextual driven form of control.  As such, Proactive 
Control is more conceptually similar to earlier uses of the term Cognitive Control in which 
the subject may well be conscious of the control and its consequences.  By contrast, 
Reactive Control is thought to be stimulus driven and occurs “after the occurrence of an 
imperative event” (Braver et al., 2007, p. 79).  It is Reactive Control then, according to 
Braver et al., that accounts for item specific phenomena, and is most likely related to the 
ACC activation and feedback mechanism posited by Botvinick et al. (2001).  Reactive 
Control, as the mechanism by which item level effects arise, is therefore what is largely 
responsible for “strategic” control in many tasks, including the Stroop effect. 
Perhaps the most striking expression of item specificity has been demonstrated by 
Schmidt and Besner (2008) who elegantly showed how contingencies between the 
dimensions of the different stimuli interact in the Stroop paradigm.  Of serious import, they 
demonstrated that the contingency between each combination of print colour and colour 
word in the Stroop task has its own impact on performance.  That is, the word green 
appearing in the print colour blue can have a distinct contingency from the word green 
appearing in the print colour yellow.  Thus, the simple case of a general central mechanism 
that modulates attention to task level, or even item level components is called into 
question.  This raises the question of what common control mechanisms exist between 
tasks.  If the error detection/attentional control mechanism proposed by Botvinick and 
colleagues holds given Schmidt and Besner's (2008) results, albeit with a level of 
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specificity modification, then it seems probable that the mechanism is not a unitary one 
shared by many distinct processes, but rather is more of an epiphenomenon and represents 
a fundamental way in which conflicts amongst stimuli are resolved.  In line with Braver et 
al.'s (2007) conception of Reactive Control, if each separate component of a stimulus has a 
unique relation with the other components, then the application of an error 
detection/control framework as above requires separate control nodes for each combination 
of the multiple components of a stimulus.   
An Alternative Account of Congruency Proportion effects 
 An alternative way to account for the intricate and complex behaviour seen in many 
cognitive paradigms is to limit the role of top-down control (or strategic processing) to 
response selection.  As such, subjects would use Cognitive Control to implement task 
instructions, but CP effects would arise from an entirely separate mechanism.  One 
example of such an account is a formal model proposed by Melara and Algom (2003).  
Melara and Algom (2003) depart from much of the literature in a number of 
interesting ways.  For example, their model includes a role for trial-to-trial (short-term) 
memory as well as long-term memory, and starts from the implicit assumption that 
subjects need not be aware of (or in control of) all of their behaviour.  To oversimplify 
their account, it is the inclusion of a memory of recent past trials that produces CP effects 
(see Figure 3).  More specifically, their model is structurally similar to Botvinick et al.'s 
model, with the difference being in small part the labels given to the specific components 
(i.e., perceptual space in Melara and Algom's model is analogous to the input nodes in 
Botvinick et al.'s model), and in large part the component that gives rise to CP effects.  




Figure 3. This graphical depiction of the model is from Melara and Algom (2003), which  
highlights the role of short-term memory in CP effects.  This model is conceptually similar 
but differs in implementation and in a few vital ways from Botvinick et al.’s (2001) model.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the most important difference is the short-term memory 
component (B).  Stimuli activate both a short-term representation (a sum of recent events) 
and a long-term representation (D) (which functions more like representations in the 
Botvinick et al. (2001) model).  The main significance of this is that the short-term 
memory unit drives this models ability to produce CP effects.  Thus there is no role for the 
ACC in this implemented account of CP effects. 
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Here, whereas Botvinick et al. use an error detector that modulates the influence of other 
components, Melara and Algom use a short-term memory component that interacts with 
long-term memory (or “pre-set” values).  It is important to highlight then, that whereas 
Botvinick et al. suggest that increases in conflict monitoring (or recent events) reinforce 
task demands, Melara and Algom posit that short-term memory (or recent events) interact 
with task demands.  More importantly, however, it is the way in which recent events are 
captured that distinguished these two prominent models. Specifically, whereas the 
Botvinick et al. (2001) model simply measures the amount of conflict on a given trial, the 
Melara and Algom (2003) model measures (at least theoretically) the entirety of the 
previous events.  Here, short-term memory is thought to record not only the proportion of 
congruent to incongruent trials (by summing across recent events), but also other stimulus 
dimensions (e.g., such as font) on a trial-by-trial basis.  In essence, this model captures 
some of the better qualities of traditional memory models (see the MINERVA II memory 
model for example, Hintzman, 1984, 1986), and integrates them into a processing model 
framework.   
 While some of the examples of research above (e.g., Bugg et al., 2008; Schmidt & 
Besner, 2008) suggest problems for a single top-down Cognitive Control mechanism to 
explain CP effects (that Melara and Algom's model does not share), there is also a 
particular study that seems well suited to highlight the difference in the two modeling 
approaches outlined here. Whereas most studies confound proportion training with the 
conflict task under investigation (the proportion of congruent trials is learned while doing 
the task), Tagliabue, Zorzi, Umilta, and Bassignani (2000) were able to delineate these two 
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factors by employing a congruency stimulus/response mapping task prior to a conflict task.  
Specifically, they studied the impact of a stimulus/response mapping pre-task on children’s 
performance on the Simon task, which will briefly be described below.   
When a to-be-identified stimulus is presented to the left or right of a central 
fixation, subjects are faster and more accurate when the stimulus location, despite being 
irrelevant to the task, is on the same side as the correct response key.  This is commonly 
referred to as the Simon effect (see Simon, 1990, for a review) and is a robust and easily 
replicable phenomenon (Lu & Proctor, 1995).  Convention is to refer to Compatible and 
Incompatible trials/conditions in the Simon literature, but for the sake of consistency, I will 
maintain the use of the terms Congruent, Incongruent, and Congruency Proportion (CP) 
when referring to specific conditions in this task.  On the first day of Tagliabue et al.'s 
(2000) study, children performed a localization task in one of two conditions.  In the 
“congruent” condition, they identified a stimulus via key press that was always mapped 
ipsilaterally (i.e., if the stimulus appeared on the left side of the screen, the correct 
response key was on the left side of the keyboard), and in the “incongruent” condition, 
they identified a stimulus that was always mapped contralaterally (i.e., if the stimulus 
appeared on the left side of the screen, the correct response key was on the right side of the 
keyboard).  On the second day, all the children did the Simon task, with the usual results. 
Specifically, the children were faster and more accurate when the stimulus location, despite 
being irrelevant to the task, was on the same side as the correct response key.  However, 
the children who had previously been in the congruent condition in the previous task, 
performed the Simon task as though they were in a high CP version of the Simon task.  
   
 20 
The children who had previously been in the incongruent condition on the previous task, 
on the other hand, performed the Simon task as though they were in a low CP version of 
the Simon task. 
 Tagliabue et al.'s (2000) data effectively demonstrated that recent memories from a 
different task can produce an effect that looks (and may in fact prove to be) a CP effect.  
Viewed from the perspective of the Melara and Algom (2003) model, this effect could be 
interpreted as arising from the “automatic” spatially corresponding response, the controlled 
response (response selection in accordance with task instructions), and the influence of 
recent memories that, while not for the Simon task, had enough similarity to be cued from 
memory and influence the children's behaviour.  Melara and Algom are very explicit in 
defining the short-term memory component of their model as implicit and unconscious, 
and thus provide an existence proof for a way of conceptualizing Cognitive Control solely 
as a mechanistic interaction of the kind we have some insight into (i.e., short-term, long-
term memory and response selection interactions). 
Interim Conclusion 
 There has been a vast body of research conducted on the influences of subtle 
changes in the field of information available to us in a task, and how these subtle changes 
influence our behaviour. What is worthwhile noting here, however, is that very little of this 
research directly tackles the question of whether these changes in behaviour are due to 
conscious effortful control or are the result of some other mechanism.  This omission is not 
really surprising.  In some cases, it is most probable that there is an implicit assumption 
that our behaviour is of course under our control, and therefore must be conscious.  
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Although appealing, this assumption is premature.  This omission is also probably due in 
part to the complex nature of the question, as “consciousness” and “control” are difficult 
concepts to tackle and explicitly define. 
 Nonetheless, it seems vital that as we delve into more and more complicated 
patterns of behaviour, we need to be clear about what we mean by consciousness, and 
when we think consciousness is in play.  In the case of manipulations of CP, there are a 
few clear conclusions.  The first concerns the general pattern of behaviour identified across 
a very wide range of studies showing the impact of CP manipulations on behaviour.  
Generally, as the proportion of congruent trials increases, the subjects performance on the 
task gets faster (and less error prone).  Secondly, there is certainly a component of 
consciousness in these tasks (as there must be in all tasks).  The subject is very likely 
aware on some level of his/her performance as he/she is in the midst of performing the 
task.  In some cases they may get immediate feedback on a trial-by-trial basis from the task 
itself (depending on the methodology).  Probably in all cases, subjects do have at least a 
limited sense of how well they are doing on the task as they notice the number of errors 
they make while making them.  The real issue at play then is the following question: does 
this conscious involvement account for the CP effect? 
 There is a growing body of evidence that suggests that CP effects do not arise from 
the conscious involvement in the task.  The largest and most compelling part of this 
evidence is that CP effects can be extremely complex.  At face value, it is difficult to 
believe that subjects are able to hold on to the very complex set of contingencies involved 
with a large number of associations in a given task.  This is especially compelling when 
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contrasted against our ability to remember the name of a person we just met in a social 
circumstance, or a new phone number.  How are we able to remember such a large number 
of complex associations and have them consistently affect our performance when the 
merest task of remembering a name or phone number can be so difficult?  This research, 
and the questions it raises, does not invalidate the work that has gone before it empirically 
or theoretically.  It does however suggest that perhaps the largest component of CP effects 
does not come from conscious effort, but from some other source. 
It may be that we need to strictly redefine what we mean by “control”.  The terms 
“control” and “Cognitive Control” have become confused with descriptions of complex 
behaviour.  Perhaps we need to redefine control as Braver et al. (2007) have, with two 
separate components:  one being a conscious form of control, which represents the type of 
control we use in deciding how to interact with our environment;  the other being an 
unconscious form of control, in which memory and attention interact to make use of the 
information around us.  Even this delineation of control does not go far enough.  Once we 
separate consciousness from "control", then we are left asking, what is the nature of 
unconscious control?  Is it a unitary mechanism in which we can plug in whatever task we 
are currently occupied with?  Or, is it the other extreme? Specifically, could it be an 
epiphenomenon; not a form of control at all but just a pattern of how information from 
different sources interacts?  It is very likely that individual views on this question are 
largely informed by opinions on the nature of memory and attention. 
Although these are difficult questions, they need not be answered in a vacuum.  
There are particular examples of research already conducted that address this problem to 
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some degree.  As such, this thesis will be primarily concerned with tying these disparate 
studies together, along with new research presented here, in order to more fully understand 
how Cognitive Control should be viewed in the future.  Thus, the overarching goals of this 
thesis are to (1) examine the phenomenological nature of Cognitive Control (i.e., whether 
the processes underlying Cognitive Control are available to consciousness), and (2) 
examine the extent to which CP effects in conflict tasks (such as the Stroop and Size 
Congruity task) arise from a central and unitary (Cognitive Control) mechanism or from a 
non-unitary set of mechanisms. 
Methods and Approach 
The first experimental goal then, is to see to what extent consciousness plays a role 
in Cognitive Control.  It may seem remarkable that this question has remained unanswered, 
especially in light of over 100 years of implicit language suggesting that consciousness is 
very central to control.  Experimental 1 will tackle this question head on by examining the 
degree to which people are consciously aware of experimental manipulations that modulate 
control in a task.  Additionally, in Experiment 4, I examine the degree to which one’s 
susceptibility to variables that modulate control are related to measures of individual 
differences in Cognitive Control. 
The second, and arguably more important, experimental goal will be to determine 
the extent to which Cognitive Control is a unitary or multidimensional phenomenon.  This 
second goal will be addressed by examining the degree to which control operates similarly 
or differently in different conflict tasks (Experiments 2 to 4).  To do this, Experiments 2 
and 3 will utilize the Size Congruity paradigm in two between-subject experiments.  This 
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paradigm offers some unique benefits over other paradigms when exploring Cognitive 
Control.  Specifically, there are two main versions of the task (Numerical Judgement and 
Physical Judgement) which differ only in terms of instructions.  In addition, in the 
Numerical Judgement variant of the task, there is a clear and well understood delineation 
of the semantic space, which will be discussed later. 
Experiment 4 will extend this line of research by directly comparing the effects of 
CP in the Size Congruity paradigm and the Stroop paradigm in a single within-subjects 
experiment.  The Stroop task is useful to include here as it offers a well known “baseline” 
and “gold standard” by which the other two tasks can be compared.  If the same 
mechanism is applied consistently to different tasks under a CP manipulation, we would 
expect to see a high degree of correlation between the relative size of the effects that the 
CP manipulation elicits.  To be clear, if Cognitive Control is a unitary mechanism, it 
means that the different tasks will be modulated by precisely the same mechanism.  
Whereas there may be differences in the magnitude of the sizes of the effects across task, 
those differences should correlate across tasks.   
Additionally, there is an opportunity here to examine other measures of Cognitive 
Control, and address the first experimental goal.  Specifically, two measures that capture 
some of the conscious aspects of control are the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 
(Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982), which measures slips in attention, and 
the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983), which is viewed as a 
measure of the extent to which an individual engages (attends effortfully) in a task.  
 These two experimental goals should provide evidence for or against the centrality 
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of a Cognitive Control mechanism, at least insofar as it relates to CP effects.  If the CP 
manipulation elicits a response from a unitary attentional control mechanism (i.e., 
Cognitive Control as defined by Botvinick et al., 2001), we would expect to see a pattern 
of behaviour that would indicate a common influence.  If, however, the CP manipulation 
elicits a response from a more complex set of control mechanisms, we may see little 
consistency in CP effects across tasks. 
 There are two main experimental methodologies that will be used to achieve these 
two experimental goals in this thesis: manipulations of CP, and assessments of Reliability 
and Cross Task Consistency. These will be discussed in turn below. 
Congruency Proportion Manipulations 
 The manipulation of the proportion of congruent trials, or CP manipulation, is a 
straight forward experimental factor.  In all the experiments in this thesis, the proportion of 
congruent trials will be at one of three levels.  All four experiments utilize two congruency 
proportions; .25 in which most of the trials (75%) are incongruent, and .75 in which most 
of the trials (75%) are congruent.  In addition, Experiment 2 includes a .50 CP condition in 
which half of the trials are congruent and half incongruent.  
Assessing Reliability and Cross Task Consistency 
In Experiment 4, I assess reliability by correlating the Stroop effect and Size 
Congruity effect across two different points in time.  To do this, difference scores from the 
different tasks (representing the magnitude of the Congruency and CP effects in each task) 
will be directly compared.  This method has been used successfully in the past (see 
Borgmann et al., 2007 and Stolz et al., 2005 for examples of this approach applied to the 
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Simon Task and Semantic Priming respectively) and will be discussed in more detail in the 
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Chapter 2: Experiment 1 
 Investigations of the type that are of interest here are, at least in part, of a broad 
nature and rarely directly investigated.  The role of consciousness in CP manipulation 
paradigms has been largely overlooked, perhaps due to the vagueness in the language used, 
and the difficulties associated with specifying definitions and operationalizing the 
construct.  As such, a methodologically solipsistic view would suggest an early starting 
point for this investigation.  In other words, step one should be to simply ask subjects if 
they are consciously aware of the effect that they are producing.   
 The most straightforward approach in this case is to use a simple task and then ask 
subjects about their subjective experiences.  This approach will answer the most basic 
question of whether or not subjects are aware of the size of the congruency effects that are 
manifested in their responses.  It also affords the opportunity to ask subjects to estimate the 
size of their congruency effect, and measure the degree to which their subjective 
estimations are correlated to their actual effect. If subjects are able to predict their 
congruency effect, then it suggests that subjects are doing so consciously, or at the very 
least, that they are consciously aware of the output of whatever processes are generating 
the CP effect.   
 An appropriate task widely believed to reflect some combination of automatic and 
controlled processes is the Simon task (Kornblum, Hasbrouq, & Osman, 1990; Lu & 
Proctor, 1995; Simon, 1990).  As noted in the introduction, when a to-be-identified 
stimulus (e.g., a colour patch) is presented to the left or right of a central fixation, subjects 
are faster and more accurate when the stimulus location, despite being irrelevant to the 
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task, is on the same side as the correct response key.  This is commonly referred to as the 
Simon effect, and is one of the hallmark effects used to index aspects of Cognitive Control 
(see Simon, 1990, for a  review).      
 The Simon effect is argued to arise because two separate internal responses are 
generated: an automatic spatially corresponding response and a controlled response based 
on task instructions (e.g., Kornblum, Hasbrouq, & Osman, 1990; Lu & Proctor, 1995; 
Simon, 1990).  When the automatic and controlled processes produce the same response 
(i.e., the correct response key corresponds spatially to the stimulus location; a congruent 
trial) subjects are faster than when the automatic and controlled processes produce 
different responses (i.e., the correct response key does not correspond spatially to the 
stimulus location; an incongruent trial).  CP modulates both the magnitude and direction of 
the Simon effect.  Previous work has established that when CP is high, the Simon effect is 
large, and when CP is low, the Simon effect actually reverses direction (e.g., Borgmann et 
al., 2007; Toth et al., 1995).   
 The Simon task is particularly appropriate here, not only because it is a hallmark 
Cognitive Control task, but also because it elicits ample variance in responses, which in 
turn has the potential to produce differences in subjective experience.  This difference in 
relative variance is important from a measurement standpoint (both in terms of reaction 
times and errors), and also affords the greatest opportunity to elicit the largest possible 
variance in subjective experience from the participants.  
 An additional way that the variable subjective experiences of participating in the 
experiment can be maximized, is to use extreme CP manipulations. Using a CP of .25 and 
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.75 will increase the magnitude of congruency effects, and thus allow a maximal 
opportunity for subjects to be consciously aware of said effects.  The different Congruency 
Proportions will be implimented as a between-subjects manipulation so as to limit the 
amount of spillover effects (subjects will not be influenced by a prior CP while working on 
their current task) and eliminate the potential for anchoring effects of previous estimations 
influencing subsequent ones.    
 This design leads to a number of potential outcomes.  The first is that subject's 
estimates of the CP might predict performance at the .75 level of CP.  The second is that 
subject's estimates of the CP might predict performance at the .25 level of CP.  Finally, the 
third possibility is that subject’s estimates of CP might predict their congruency effects 
across both levels of CP.  These three possibilities allow for a graduated insight into the 
role of consciousness in CP effects.  If subject’s estimations of the actual CP predicts their 
performance within one of the two above conditions, then there is support for the idea that 
conscious control is what is behind the generation of CP effects, or at the very least, that 
subjects are intimately (and rapidly) aware of the processes that give rise to said effects.  It 
seems intuitively valid that if subjects are consciously producing the CP effect, then they 
must be aware of what the approximate proportion of trials is.  If subject’s estimations of 
the actual CP predicts their performance across the two above conditions, but not within 
each condition,  then there is also support for the idea that subjects are consciously aware 
of their relative performance.  In this case, however, the awareness most likely arises more 
slowly and after the fact.  Subjects may be able to develop a general feel for the CP as they 
do the task and still not have this awareness influence their performance.  Of course, if 
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subjects are not at all aware of the processes that give rise to CP effects, then their 
estimates will not correlate with the actual effects.  Additionally, it seems statistically 
necessary that if subject’s estimates of their performance within a CP are predictive, then 
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Experiment 1 
 In this investigation it seems particularly important to articulate to the participants a 
little bit more clearly what they will be experiencing.  It also remains important to maintain 
the typical reserve such that there are no experimenter demands on the subject.   Therefore, 
particular care was made in informing the subjects about the nature of the task.   The task 
was clearly explained, including an emphasis on the fact that there would be congruent 
trials and incongruent trials (with examples given for both) and that they would see both 
types of trials, but no hints were given as to the possibility that there may not be an equal 
proportion of these trials.  
Method 
Participants 
Seventy one undergraduates from the University of Waterloo were each paid $2 for 
their participation.  All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Design 
The experiment consisted of a 2 (Congruency: Congruent vs. Incongruent) within x 
2 (Block: Block 1 vs. Block 2) within x 2 (CP: .25 vs. .75 congruent) between mixed 
design.  Trials were considered congruent when the target appeared on the same side as the 
required response and incongruent when the target appeared on the opposite side to the 
required response.  Thirty-seven subjects were assigned to the .25 CP condition, and 34 
subjects to the .75 CP condition.  
Procedure  
 The stimuli were presented on a 17” colour monitor driven by a Pentium computer 
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running E-Prime v1.1 software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2001).  The target 
consisted of an “X” or an “O,” 8 mm vertically by 8 mm horizontally, displayed 38 mm to 
the left or right of a central fixation point (+).  Each target appeared an equal number of 
times within the experiment.  Responses were collected using a standard QWERTY 
keyboard.  Subjects used the “A” and “L” keys to make their responses. Mapping of 
stimuli to responses was counterbalanced across subjects. The midpoint between the two 
response keys was aligned with the central fixation.   
Subjects were tested individually in a sound attenuated room.  Instructions for the 
task were displayed visually and relayed verbally by the experimenter.  Subjects were told 
to identify the stimulus by pressing the appropriate key, to ignore the location of the 
stimulus, to maintain their focus on the central fixation, and to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible.  
 Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by a 
target.  The target remained on the screen until a response was made.  This was followed 
by an inter-trial interval of 500 ms.  Eighty practice trials were followed by two blocks of 
120 experimental trials.  Trial order was determined randomly for each subject.   
After participants completed the Simon task, they were asked to answer three 
questions: 
 
(1) “If you had to guess what the proportion of congruent trials was; that is, if you 
had to guess the percentage of times that the correct response key was on the 
same side as the X or O appeared, what would you guess?”  
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(2) “How confident are you of that guess?” 
(3) “Do you believe that you were able to use your knowledge of the proportion to 
do the task?” 
 
Results 
Response time (RT) analysis was conducted for trials in which the response was 
correct. RTs were submitted to a recursive data trimming procedure (Van Selst & 
Jolicoeur, 1994) using a 2.5 standard deviation cut-off in each cell resulting in 2.53% of 
the RT data being removed in the .25 condition, and 2.18% of the RT data being removed 
in the .75 condition.  Mean RT and percentage error data are presented in Figure 4.  A 2 
(Block: Block 1 vs. Block 2) x 2 (Congruency : Congruent vs. Incongruent) x 2 (CP: .25 
congruent vs. .75 congruent) mixed ANOVA was conducted on mean RT and on 
percentage errors (subject mean RTs and % Error data are presented in Appendix A).  
Reaction Times 
There was no main effect of Block (F < 1) and no interaction between the effect of 
Block and either the effects of Congruency or CP (Fs < 1).  The main effect of Congruency 
was significant, F(1, 69) = 12.6, MSE = 480.6, p < .001, as was the Congruency x CP 
interaction, F(1, 69) = 241.0, MSE = 480.6, p < .001.  This interaction was the product of  
a reversal of the Congruency effect for the two CP conditions.  Specifically, in the .25 CP 
condition, congruent trials were 31 ms slower than incongruent trials, whereas, in the .75 
CP condition, congruent trials were 50 ms faster than incongruent trials.  The Block x 
Congruency x CP interaction was not significant F(1, 69) = 2.5, MSE = 208, p = .12.   
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Errors 
 There was a main effect of Block, F (1,97) = 6.1, MSE = 14.39, p < .05, but Block 
did not interact with either Congruency or CP (Fs < 1).  The main effect of Congruency  
was significant, F(1, 97) = 9.4, MSE = 22.74, p < .005, as was the Congruency x CP 
interaction, F(1, 97) = 74.7, MSE = 22.74, p < .001.  Here, in the .25 CP condition, 
subjects made 6.6% more errors on congruent trials than on incongruent trials.  In the .75 
CP condition, however, subjects made 11.1% fewer errors on congruent trials than on 
incongruent trials.  As such, there was no speed/accuracy trade-off.  The Block x 
Congruency  x CP interaction was not significant (F < 1). 
Summary 
 The expected pattern of behaviour was observed in which responses to Congruent 
trials were faster than responses to Incongruent trials in the .75 CP condition but slower in 
the .25 CP condition.  This led to a Simon effect in the .75 CP condition and a reversal of 
the Simon effect in the .25 CP condition.  This pattern was also observed in the error data, 
which replicated previous investigations of the Simon effect, and thus permits the novel 
correlation analyses between actual and subjective responses.  
Correlational Investigation 
 Task instructions prior to commencement of the Simon task highlighted that some 
trials in the task would be congruent and some incongruent.  As noted in the procedure, 
participants were asked to answer three questions regarding their subjective experience. 
These subjective responses were subsequently correlated with participants’ behaviour (see 
Figure 5).  I am only going to focus on the question regarding their subjective estimate 



















Figure 5. Relation between the actual Simon effect and the estimated proportion of 
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of the proportion of congruent trials (question 1).  In both the .25 CP condition  (open 
circles) and the .75 CP condition (filled in circles) subjects estimates of the proportion of 
congruent trials did not predict their actual performance, r(31) = .17, p = .33, and r(32) = -
.09, p = .63, respectively.  However, these same estimates do predict performance across 
the CPs, r(69) = .60 , p < .001).   
Discussion 
 As can be seen in Figure 4, the standard Simon effect (as modulated by a 
manipulation of CP) was observed.  As can be seen in Figure 5, an interesting pattern of 
correlations between subjective experience and behaviour emerges.  The substantial and 
statistically significant correlation across CP conditions, which represents participants’ 
estimations of the proportion of congruent trials against their actual performance on the 
Simon task, indicates that subjects are at some level aware of the output of the processes 
that give rise to the congruency effect.  The question then becomes how aware are they?  
The complete lack of correlations within each level of the CP conditions indicates a 
boundary to the role of conscious awareness of performance in this task.  The pattern of 
data observed suggests that subjects become aware of the performance after the completion 
of the processes that give rise to the CP effect.  Certainly there is conscious control 
involved in the performance of any task.  The subject is conscious of the task demands, 
and willfully engages in the task.  To say that subjects are not in conscious control of the 
mechanisms that give rise to the CP effect, or the congruency effect, is not to say that 
subjects are not in conscious control of response selection.  Rather, it suggests that the 
processes that “control” the magnitude of said effects is completed somewhere between the 
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conscious desire to do the task, and conscious response selection. 
 It seems then, at a minimum, that we must update our (or constrain any newly 
generated) definition of Cognitive Control.  Whereas certainly the CP manipulation 
modulates behaviour, it does so without a conscious locus.  This does not mean however 
that there is not a control mechanism that gives rise to these effects.  Moreover, it does not 
mean that there is a control mechanism either.  It should be noted that more contemporary 
models of Cognitive Control do not include a homunculus per se.  Whether or not a model 
has a box optimistically labeled "Cognitive Control" or has a well-defined control 
mechanism, that box, component, or mechanism does not require or entail the use of 
consciousness. 
 The above data do not speak to the nature of Cognitive Control in the sense that 
they do not describe how it works except to exclude consciousness as a central component.  
What then remains to be determined, is the extent to which Cognitive Control is a unitary 
or multidimensional phenomenon.  The experiments presented in Chapter 3 address this 
issue, and seek to better describe the inner workings of the control mechanism(s) that gives 
rise to CP effects. 
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Chapter 3: Experiments 2 and 3 
 Hand-in-hand with the assumption of the role of consciousness in Cognitive 
Control is the assumption of centrality.  That is to say that if control is a conscious 
phenomenon, it is by its very nature probably a single central mechanism.  However, 
excluding consciousness from our conception of Cognitive Control does not mean that 
Cognitive Control is not a single central mechanism.  The problem, of course, is that any 
comparison between different tasks opens the door to the possibility that differences in 
performance and observed behaviour between tasks may be due to the very fact that the 
tasks themselves use different components, rather than to differences in how Cognitive 
Control is manifested.  Without knowing how component task processes influence (or are 
influenced by) potential control processes, there is no way to separate the aspects of 
performance that arose out of those differing component processes, versus aspects of 
performance that arose out of Cognitive Control processes. 
 This problem is exacerbated by the findings of numerous fMRI studies that have 
found a wide degree of variability in brain activation patterns associated with differing 
tasks requiring Cognitive Control (e.g., Bush et al., 2000).  The ACC, as outlined in the 
introduction, is thought to be the anatomical location of the "error detector" that is a central 
part of the Cognitive Control mechanism proposed by Botvinick et al. (2001).  Even if 
multiple tasks produced fMRI data with overlapping activation in the ACC, however, it 
could still be argued that separate mechanisms in the same location were being utilized.  
This severely limits the utility of fMRI as a method for the investigation at hand. 
 What is needed here are two tasks that share virtually everything, except for the 
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allocation of control in the tasks.  If a set of tasks can be found that vary only in their task 
instructions (the instructions that speak to Cognitive Control), then differences in 
performance between the tasks can be greatly reduced.  Therefore, the only cause of 
differences in task performance will be due to the differences in the interplay of component 
processes that arise out of the differing task instructions.  Fortunately, the Size Congruity 
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Experiment 2 
The Size Congruity Paradigm 
 The Size Congruity effect refers to the impact that congruency between the 
physical (e.g., font size of Arabic numerals) and symbolic (numerical magnitude) 
dimensions of a numerical stimulus has on the time it takes to make a judgement about that 
stimulus.  In numerous experiments with both adults and children it has been shown that 
the physical size of an Arabic numeral or number word affects the processing of relative 
magnitude (e.g., Ansari, Fugelsang, Dhital, & Venkatraman, 2006; Besner & Coltheart, 
1979; Girelli, Lucangeli, & Butterworth, 2000; Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Rubinsten, Henik, 
Berger, & Shahar-Shalev, 2002; Schwarz & Ischebeck, 2003).  Typically, subjects are 
asked to identify which of two numbers is numerically larger, and to ignore the physical 
size in which the numbers are presented.  The standard finding is that subjects are faster 
when the numerically larger numeral also appears in a larger font size (congruent trial) 
than when the numeral printed in the larger font size is numerically smaller (incongruent 
trial).  Thus, there is significant interference on the judgement of relative numerical 
magnitude from the irrelevant physical size.  Conversely, it has also been found that when 
subjects are asked to judge which of two stimuli is physically larger, there is interference 
from the irrelevant numerical magnitude (e.g., Schwarz & Ischebeck, 2003; Tzelgov, 
Meyer, & Henik, 1992).  This impact of irrelevant numerical information on physical 
judgements is typically smaller than the impact of physical information on numerical 
judgements (e.g., Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Schwarz & Ischebeck, 2003).  Although 
previous work has indicated that both irrelevant numerical magnitude interferes with 
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relative physical size judgements and, conversely, irrelevant physical size interferes with 
subjects’ abilities to judge which of two numbers is numerically larger, the relative 
equivalence of these two types of interference effects has not been systematically assessed 
with a CP manipulation.   
 Because the proportion of congruent trials modulates the size of the interference 
effect in many cognitive domains, it can be used as a measure of the strength of particular 
effects of irrelevant (but conflicting) stimulus dimensions.  In addition, given that CP is 
thought to index strategic control, according to Botvinick and colleagues (Botvinick et al., 
2001), this manipulation offers a powerful method by which to test the relative strength of 
the interference effects in both directions, and the degree to which such control influences 
responding to that dimension (i.e., physical versus numerical dimension) of the stimuli.  
Against the background of the evidence for a stronger influence of physical size on 
numerical magnitude relative to numerical magnitude on physical size judgements, it is 
expected that the CP manipulation will have a larger influence in the Numerical Judgement 
task than the Physical Judgement task.  Specifically, the Congruency x CP interaction will 
likely be larger in the Numerical Judgement task than in the Physical Judgement task.  This 
is not to say that there will be no effect of CP on the Physical Judgement task.  Due to the 
significant impact of the numerical dimension on physical judgements, a significant CP 
effect in the Physical Judgement task (although one that is relatively smaller than the CP 
effect for the Numerical Judgement task) should also be found. 
 Although some aspects of these tasks are difficult to compare (e.g., the equivalence 
of a unit of Symbolic Distance to a unit of Physical Distance), using an identical design 
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with the only difference being the task instructions will provide useful insight into how 
these stimuli are processed.  This should allow for the symbolic component (i.e., accessing 
semantics) of the Numerical Judgement task to be pitted against the more purely visual 
components of the Physical Judgement task.   
An additional benefit of this methodology is that in the Numerical Judgement task, 
there exists a well understood delineation of the semantic space.  As the Symbolic Distance 
increases between two numbers to be compared, the time it takes to make such a 
comparison decreases (Moyer & Landauer, 1967).  For example, subjects are faster to say 
that 9 is larger than 1 than to say that 5 is larger than 1.  If this Symbolic Distance effect is 
also influenced by a CP manipulation, then it would seem likely that there is overlap in the 
time course of the semantic activation of numerical information, and the control 
mechanism that gives rise to the CP manipulation.  If, however, there is no interaction, 
then the opposite conclusion can be made, that there is no overlap in processes (Sternberg, 
1969).  There is little discussion of the interplay of semantic access and the role of 
Cognitive Control in most of the literature.  As such, the logical prediction should be that a 
CP manipulation will have no impact on the Symbolic Distance effect.   
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and eight undergraduates from the University of Waterloo 
participated in the experiment for course credit.  Fifty-five students participated in the 
Numerical Judgement task, and 53 participated in the Physical Judgement task.  All 
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
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Design 
 Each task (Numerical and Physical Judgements) contained stimuli that varied in 
terms of Congruency (Congruent vs. Incongruent), Symbolic Distance (2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 
units) and CP (.25 congruent, .50 congruent, and .75 congruent).  Stimuli consisted of the 
numerical digits 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 and were presented in Arial font sizes 58 (1.96° of 
visual angle) and 30 (1.06° of visual angle), with each of 1, 2, and 3 being presented in 
every possible combination with 5, 6 and 7 in both font sizes.  Congruency and Symbolic 
Distance were within-subject variables and CP was a between-subjects variable.  For the 
Numerical Judgement task, 19 subjects participated in the .25 CP condition, 18 subjects in 
the .50 CP condition, and 18 subjects in the .75 CP condition.  For the Physical Judgement 
task, 17 subjects participated in the .25 CP condition, 17 subjects in the .50 CP condition, 
and 19 subjects in the .75 CP condition.  Trials were considered congruent when the 
stimulus was both numerically larger and physically larger (e.g., 7 and 2), and incongruent 
when the target stimulus was numerically larger but physically smaller (e.g., 7 and 2).   
Procedure 
 The stimuli were presented on a 17” colour monitor driven by a Pentium computer 
running E-Prime v1.1 software (Schneider et al., 2001).  The targets consisted of two 
numerals presented to the left and right of a central fixation point (+).  The physically large 
numeral was presented in font size 58 and the physically small numeral was presented in 
font size 30.  Responses were collected using a standard QWERTY keyboard.  Subjects 
used the “Q” and “P” keys to make their responses.  Mapping of stimuli to responses was 
counterbalanced across subjects.  The midpoint between the two response keys was aligned 
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with the central fixation.  Subjects were tested individually in a sound attenuated room.  
Instructions for the task were displayed visually and relayed verbally by the experimenter.  
Subjects were also requested to respond as quickly and accurately as possible.  
 Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross which was presented for a 
random duration of 600, 900, or 1200 ms. Subsequently, the numerals were presented and 
remained on the screen until a response was made.  Twelve practice trials (with a CP of 
.50) were followed by 108 experimental trials.  Trial order was determined randomly for 
each subject.   
Results 
Reaction Times 
RT analysis was conducted for all trials in which the response was correct.  RTs 
were submitted to a recursive data trimming procedure (Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1994) using 
a 2.5 standard deviation cut-off in each cell resulting in 2.32% of the RT data being 
removed (subject mean RTs and % Error data are presented in Appendix B).  
The alpha level for all statistical tests was set at .05 (two-tailed) unless otherwise 
stated.  A 2 (Congruency: Congruent vs. Incongruent) x 5 (Symbolic Distance: 2, 3, 4, 5, 
and 6 units) x 3 (CP: .25, .50, and .75 congruent) x 2 (Task: Numerical Judgement vs. 
Physical Judgement) mixed ANOVA conducted on mean RTs (see Figure 6) revealed a 
main effect of Congruency, F(1, 102) = 203.6, MSE = 1273, p < .001, a main effect of 
Symbolic Distance, F(4, 408) = 8.7, MSE = 672.4, p < .001, and a main effect of Task, 
F(1, 102) = 69.2, MSE = 47681, p < .001. There was no main effect of CP (F < 1).   
 





















Figure 6.  Mean RTs (ms) and percentage errors as a function of Judgement Task, 
Congruency Proportion, Congruency, and Symbolic Distance for Experiment 2 . 
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 The analyses are now decomposed by focusing on two key aspects of the data: (1) 
interactions between Congruency, CP and Task, and (2) interactions with Symbolic 
Distance.   
Congruency, congruency proportion and task.  Most importantly, and in line with 
the predictions, there was a three-way interaction between Congruency, CP and Task, F(2, 
102) = 15.7, MSE = 1273, p < .001.  As is evident in Figure 6, the CP manipulation 
interacted unequally on the Congruency effect for the Numerical Judgement task, F(2, 52) 
= 29.4, MSE = 1977, p < .001, and the Physical Judgement Task F(2, 50) = 4.0, MSE = 
540, p < .05.  Specifically, the size congruency effect (incongruent – congruent) for the 
Numerical Judgement task increased from 16 ms in the .25 CP condition, to 53 ms in the 
.50 CP condition, to 87 ms in the .75 CP condition.  For the Physical Judgement task, 
however, the congruency effect was 6 ms in both the .25 CP and .50 CP conditions, and 
increased to 18 ms in the .75 CP condition. 
Consistent with prior research, Congruency and Task also interacted, F(1, 102) = 
94.9, MSE = 1273, p < .001, in that the difference between congruent and incongruent 
trials was larger for the Numerical Judgement task (mean difference = 52 ms) than the 
Physical Judgement task (mean difference = 10 ms).  In addition, the predicted two-way 
interaction between Congruency and CP was also significant, F(1, 102) = 30.8, MSE = 
1273, p < .001, such that as the proportion of congruent trials increased, so too did the 
difference between RTs for congruent and incongruent trials. 
Interactions with symbolic distance. With respect to interactions with Symbolic 
Distance, there was an interaction between the effect of Symbolic Distance and Task, F(4, 
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408) = 14.5, MSE = 841, p < .001, such that the Symbolic Distance effect in the Numerical 
Judgement task was larger than in the Physical Judgement task.  A post hoc analysis 
examining the effect of Symbolic Distance for each Judgement task revealed a main effect 
of Symbolic Distance in the Numerical Judgement task F(4, 208) = 15.6, MSE = 969.3  p < 
.001, and a main effect of Symbolic Distance in the Physical Judgement task F(4, 200) = 
2.8, MSE = 363.7  p < .05, but in the opposite direction, such that in the Physical 
Judgement task, as Symbolic Distance increased, so too did RT. No other main effects or 
interactions were significant (largest F = 1.5).  
Errors 
An analogous 2 (Congruency: Congruent vs. Incongruent) x 5 (Symbolic Distance: 
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 units) x 3 (CP: .25, .50, and .75 congruent) x 2 (Task: Numerical 
Judgement vs. Physical Judgement) mixed ANOVA was conducted on errors and revealed 
a significant four-way interaction, F(8, 408) = 2.3, MSE = 19.8, p < .05.  Additionally, a 
main effect of Congruency, F(1, 102) = 30.7, MSE = 41.2, p < .001, a main effect of 
Symbolic Distance, F(4, 408) = 2.6, MSE = 21.5, p < .05, and a main effect of CP, F(1, 
102) = 5.2, MSE = 133.2, p < .01 were observed.  There was no main effect of Task (F < 
1).  The error analyses are further decomposed in a parallel fashion to the RT analyses.  
Congruency, congruency proportion and task.  As with the RT analyses, and 
central to the predictions, there was a three-way interaction between Congruency, CP and 
Task, F(2, 102) = 14.84, MSE = .003, p < .001.  This interaction was of identical form to 
the RTs.  Specifically, the CP manipulation interacted unequally on the Congruency effect 
for the Numerical Judgement task , F(2, 52) = 11.5, MSE = 58.8, p < .001, and the Physical 
   
 49 
Judgement Task F(2, 50) = 5.8, MSE = 23.0, p < .01.  Here, the size congruency effect 
(incongruent – congruent) for the Numerical Judgement task increased from 1% errors in 
the .25 CP condition, to 1.8% errors in the .50 CP condition, to 7.9% errors in the .75 CP 
condition whereas for the Physical Judgement task the congruency effect increased from -
0.8% errors in the .25 CP condition, to 0.4% errors in the .50 CP condition, to 2.7% errors 
in the .75 CP condition. 
Congruency and Task also interacted, F(1, 102) = 12.9, MSE = 41, p < .01, in that 
the difference between congruent and incongruent trials was larger for the Numerical 
Judgement task (mean difference = 3.5% errors) than the Physical Judgement task (mean 
difference = 0.8% errors).  In addition, the predicted two-way interaction between 
Congruency and CP was also significant, F(1, 102) = 17.0, MSE = 41, p < .001, such that 
as the proportion of congruent trials increased, so too did the difference between errors for 
congruent and incongruent trials. 
 Interactions with symbolic distance.  With respect to interactions with Symbolic 
Distance, there was a two-way interaction between Symbolic Distance and Task, F(4, 408) 
= 2.9, MSE = 21.5, p < .05, and a marginal interaction between Symbolic Distance and 
Congruency, F(4, 408) = 2.0, MSE = 19.8, p = .09.  No other main effects or interactions 
were significant (largest F = 1.70). 
Discussion 
 In summary, the most important of the above results is the clear asymmetry in the 
size of the congruency effect (and how the congruency effect is modulated by the CP 
manipulation) between the Numerical Judgement task and the Physical Judgement task. 
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Specifically, the effect of Congruency, and the Congruency by CP interaction was larger 
for the Numerical Judgement task, than the Physical Judgement task.   
On the surface, these results challenge a unitary notion of control, as such a model 
should assume that control would be manifested (as a function of the manipulation of CP) 
to a similar degree for both variants of the task.  It is possible, however, that the 
differential impact of CP could be a product of the ease with which each dimension of the 
tasks is processed, and not due to the differential impact of control per se.  Indeed, there is 
a fair amount of evidence for this latter argument in the literature.  For example, typically 
in size congruity experiments, the physical size judgement is faster than the numerical size 
judgement.  As such, the effect of the irrelevant numerical magnitude on physical size 
judgements is correspondingly smaller than the effect of the irrelevant physical size on 
numerical magnitude judgements (e.g., Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Schwarz & Ischebeck, 
2003).  Furthermore, developmental studies suggest that young children do not show an 
interference effect of numerical magnitude on physical size judgements, suggesting that 
the automatic activation of numerical magnitude during judgements of the physical size of 
numerical digits emerges gradually over developmental time  (Rubinstein, Henik, Berger, 
& Shahar-Shalev, 2002; Girelli, Lucangeli, & Butterworth, 2000).  As such, it could be the 
case that this very asymmetry in mean response time also leads to the asymmetry in the 
influence of the CP manipulation (i.e., we might find this asymmetry due to a scaling 
effect).   
An additional factor that may have influenced the outcome of this experiment is the 
inclusion of five Symbolic Distances and only one Physical Distance.  This could result in 
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making the physical distance dimension more salient to participants, and thus easier.  
Although it is difficult to find a basis on which to equate Physical and Symbolic Distances, 
an effort was made to replicate the key findings of Experiment 2 with a more parametric 
design that included more Physical distances and fewer Symbolic distances (see Pansky & 
Algom (1999) for a discussion on the difficulties associated with equating these two 
dimensions).  Therefore, Experiment 3 was conducted with these factors in mind.  
Specifically, the Physical Judgement task was made more difficult via the inclusion of 
three physical sizes, each closer in size than the original physical difference.  Additionally, 
the number of Symbolic Distances was reduced from five distances to three distances.  
Experiment 3 should then provide a stricter test of the Congruency x CP x Task three-way 
interaction as both the mean speed of the tasks, and the number of levels of Physical and 
Symbolic Distance will be roughly equated.   





Sixty-nine undergraduate students with normal or corrected-to-normal vision from 
the University of Waterloo participated for course credit. 
Design 
Each task (Numerical and Physical Judgement) contained stimuli that varied in 
terms of Congruency (Congruent vs. Incongruent), Symbolic Distance (1, 3, and 5 units) 
and CP (.25 vs. .75 congruent).  Stimuli consisted of the numerical digits 1 through 9 
inclusive, presented in Arial font sizes 44 (1.47° of visual angle), 54 (1.88° of visual 
angle), and 64 (2.21° of visual angle) with each numeral being presented in every possible 
combination of congruency and font size.  CP was manipulated by presenting 
proportionately more (.25 or .75) congruent trials from the stimulus set while maintaining 
an equal number of trials at each of the three distances for both tasks.  Therefore, trial 
composition was identical for the Numerical and Physical Judgement task and was 
invariant across CP. 
Congruency and Symbolic Distance were within-subject variables, and CP and 
Judgement task were between-subjects variables.  For the Numerical Judgement task, 17 
subjects participated in the .25 CP condition and 17 subjects in the .75 CP condition.  For 
the Physical Judgement task, 16 subjects participated in the .25 CP condition, and 19 
subjects participated in the .75 CP condition.  Trials were considered congruent when the 
stimulus was both numerically and physically larger (e.g., 7 and 2), and incongruent when 
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the target stimulus was numerically larger but physically smaller (e.g., 7 and 2).  
Procedure  
The stimuli were presented on a 17” colour monitor driven by a Pentium computer 
running E-Prime v1.1 software (Schneider et al., 2001).  The targets consisted of two 
numerals presented to the right and left of a central fixation point (+).  The physically large 
numeral was presented in font size 64 or 54 and the physically small numeral was 
presented in font size 54 or 44.  Responses were collected using a standard QWERTY 
keyboard.  Subjects used the “Q” and “P” keys to make their responses.  Mapping of 
stimuli to responses was counterbalanced across subjects.  The midpoint between the two 
response keys was aligned with the central fixation.  Subjects were tested individually in a 
sound attenuated room.  Instructions for the task were displayed visually and relayed 
verbally by the experimenter.  Subjects were also requested to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible.  
 Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation point that was presented for 900 
ms.  Subsequently, the target numerals were presented and remained on the screen until a 
response was made.  Twelve practice trials with a CP of .50 were followed by 576 
experimental trials.  Trial order was determined randomly for each subject.   
Results 
Reaction Times 
RT analysis was conducted for all trials in which the response was correct.  RTs 
were submitted to a recursive data trimming procedure (Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1994) 
using a 2.5 standard deviation cut-off in each cell resulting in 3.8% of the RT data being 
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removed. The alpha level for all statistical tests was set at .05 (two-tailed) unless otherwise 
stated (subject mean RTs and % Error data are presented in Appendix C).  
A 2 (Congruency: Congruent vs. Incongruent) x 3 (Symbolic Distance: 1, 3, and 5) 
x 2 (CP: .25 vs. .75 congruent) x 2 (Task: Numerical vs. Physical Judgement) mixed 
ANOVA was conducted on mean RTs (see Figure 7), revealing a significant four-way 
interaction, F(2, 130) = 6.32, MSE = 436, p < .01.  In parallel fashion to Experiment 2, the 
analyses will be decomposed by focusing on two key aspects of the data: (1) interactions 
between Congruency, CP and Task, and (2) interactions with Symbolic Distance. 
Congruency, congruency proportion and task.  Most important given our 
predictions, there was a three-way interaction between Congruency, CP and Task, F(1, 65) 
= 4.85, MSE = 2628, p < .005.  As is evident in Figure 7, the CP manipulation had a 
significant impact on the Congruency effect for the Numerical Judgement task, F(1, 32) = 
28.88, MSE = 463, p < .001, but not the Physical Judgement Task (F < 1).  Specifically, 
the size congruency effect (incongruent – congruent) for the Numerical Judgement task 
increased from 35 ms in the .25 CP condition, to 91 ms in the .75 CP condition, whereas 
for the Physical Judgement task the congruency effect remained statistically equivalent (37 
ms in the .25 CP condition, and 49 ms in the .75 CP condition). 
Consistent with prior research, Congruency and Task also interacted, F(1, 65) = 
4.0, MSE = 2628, p < .05, in that the difference between congruent and incongruent trials 
was larger for the Numerical Judgement task (mean difference = 63 ms) than the Physical 
Judgement task (mean difference = 43 ms).  In addition, the predicted two-way interaction 
between Congruency and CP was also significant, F(1, 65) = 11.23, MSE = 2628, p <  







Figure 7.  Mean RTs (ms) and percentage errors as a function of Judgement Task, 
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.01, such that as the proportion of congruent trials increased, so too did the difference 
between RTs for congruent and incongruent trials. 
Interactions with symbolic distance.  With respect to interactions with Symbolic 
Distance, there was a three-way interaction between Symbolic Distance, Congruency and 
Task, F(2, 130) = 20.0, MSE = 436, p < .001.  This three-way interaction was the product 
of two Symbolic Distance by Congruency interactions that take opposite forms in each 
Task.  Specifically, for the Numerical Judgement task, as Symbolic Distance increased, 
the size of the congruency effect got smaller, F(2, 64) = 6.50, MSE = 400, p < .01, 
whereas for the Physical Judgement task, as the Symbolic Distance increased, the size of 
the congruency effect got larger, F(2, 66) = 14.22, MSE = 471, p < .001. 
There was also a two-way interaction between Symbolic Distance and Task, F(2, 
130) = 89.40, MSE = 654, p < .001, as well as main effects of Congruency, F(1, 65) = 
109.37, MSE = 2628, p < .001, Symbolic Distance, F(2, 130) = 70.10, MSE = 654.10, p < 
.001, and Task, F(1, 65) = 6.54, MSE = 36825, p < .051. No other main effects or 
interactions were significant (largest F = 1.28).  
Errors 
An analogous 2 (Congruency: Congruent vs. Incongruent) x 3 (Symbolic Distance: 
1, 3, and 5) x 2 (CP: .25 vs. .75 congruent) x 2 (Task: Numerical vs. Physical Judgement) 
mixed ANOVA on errors revealed a significant four-way interaction, F(2, 130) = 6.67, 
                                                
1 It should be noted that the baseline Physical and Numerical judgements were virtually identical despite the 
main effect of Task.  That is, due to the differential interactions of Task with Congruency, Congruency 
Proportion and Distance, a main effect of Task is to be expected as the differences in slopes increase the 
marginal Task means. If we directly compare the congruent conditions at the medium distance (arguably the  
best approximation of a baseline for this experiment), performance on the two Tasks are not significantly 
different (mean difference = 14ms), t(67) = .929, p =.356. 
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MSE = .001, p < .01. The analysis is now decomposed in a parallel fashion to the RT 
analyses. 
Congruency, congruency proportion and task.  As with the RT analyses, and 
central to the predictions, there was a three-way interaction between Congruency, CP and 
Task, F(1, 65) = 14.84, MSE = .003, p < .001.  This interaction was of identical form to the 
RTs.  Specifically, the CP manipulation had a significant impact on the Congruency effect 
for the Numerical Judgement task, F(1, 32) = 16.10, MSE = .004, p < .001, but not the 
Physical Judgement task (F < 1). 
Congruency and Task also interacted, F(1, 65) = 5.11, MSE = .003, p < .05.  Here, 
however, the difference between congruent and incongruent trials was slightly larger for 
the Physical Judgement task (mean difference = 9.2%) than the Numerical Judgement task 
(mean difference = 7.0%).  In addition, the predicted two-way interaction between 
Congruency and CP was also significant, F(1, 65) = 10.434, MSE = .003, p < .01, such that 
as the proportion of congruent trials increased, so too did the difference between errors for 
congruent and incongruent trials. 
Interactions with symbolic distance.  With respect to interactions with Symbolic 
Distance, there was a three-way interaction between Symbolic Distance, Congruency and 
Task, F (2, 130) = 12.40, MSE = .001, p < .001.  This three-way interaction was the 
product of two Symbolic Distance by Congruency interactions that were of different 
magnitudes in each Task.  Specifically, consistent with the RT analyses for the Numerical 
Judgement task, as Symbolic Distance increased, the size of the congruency effect got 
smaller.  Unlike the RT analyses, however, for the Physical Judgement task, as Symbolic 
   
 58 
Distance increased, the size of the congruency effect also got smaller, just to a 
significantly lesser degree, F(2, 66) = 5.20, MSE = .001, p < .01.  There was also a three-
way interaction between Symbolic Distance, Congruency and Congruency Proportion, F(2, 
130) = 5.75, MSE = .001, p < .005.  Here, the modulation of the congruency effect by 
Symbolic Distance was moderately smaller for the .25 CP condition than the .75 CP 
condition.  
There were also two-way interactions between Symbolic Distance and Task, F(2, 
130) = 30.52, MSE = .001, p < .001, Symbolic Distance and Congruency, F(2, 130) = 
44.43, MSE = .001, p < .001, as well as main effects of Congruency, F(1, 65) = 227.57, 
MSE = .003, p < .001, and Symbolic Distance, F(2, 130) = 62.98, MSE = .001, p < .001. 
No other main effects or interactions were significant (largest F = 1.70). 
Discussion 
 The most important of the above results is that, as in Experiment 2, there is a clear 
asymmetry in the size of the congruency effect (and how the congruency effect is 
modulated by the CP manipulation) between the Numerical Judgement task and the 
Physical Judgement task.  Despite relatively equal baseline responses for the two 
judgement tasks (refer to footnote 1), the effect of Congruency, and the Congruency by CP 
interaction was larger for the Numerical Judgement task, than the Physical Judgement task.   
 This finding of an asymmetry in CP effects could be indicative of the relative 
fluency of the two dimensions at play in these tasks.  Schwarz and Ischebeck’s (2003) 
relative speed account of the size congruity effect, while not making any predictions about 
CP manipulations, provides a framework for understanding these results.  The Physical 
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Judgement task is based upon purely physical characteristics of the stimuli.  By contrast, 
judging the numerical symbols requires the activation of a semantic representation in order 
for the Numerical Judgement to be made.  As the Physical Judgement can be performed 
faster than the Numerical Judgement, the expected result is that the physical size of the 
stimuli interferes more with the judging the numerical size than vice versa.  Thus, the 
physical characteristics of the stimulus have a larger impact on numerical judgements than 
the semantic characteristics of the stimulus have on physical judgements.  This 
interpretation is also consistent with developmental studies of young children in which the 
activation of numerical magnitude during judgements of the physical size of numerical 
symbols emerges gradually (Rubinstein et al., 2002; Girelli et al., 2000).  The data from 
Experiment 3, however, do not fit as neatly with Schwarz and Ischebeck’s (2003) relative 
speed account: despite the mean response time for the Numerical and Physical Judgement 
tasks being similar, we still find a significant difference in the influence of the CP 
manipulation between tasks.   
Can these findings be reconciled with contemporary models of Cognitive Control? 
Given Botvinick et al.’s (2001) explanation of CP effects, to explain these results, it is first 
necessary to posit that the physical dimension of the stimulus is processed faster and more 
“automatically” (earlier, more fluently) compared to the symbolic (i.e., numerical) 
dimension.  It would then be this difference in processing fluency that subsequently 
impacts task performance: the physical dimension is amplified more by a CP manipulation 
than the impact made by the numerical dimension.  Thus, we could expect a larger impact 
on the Size Congruity effect from the irrelevant physical size dimension in the Numerical 
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Judgement task than from the irrelevant numerical size dimension in the Physical 
Judgement task.  This asymmetry in CP effects then could also be seen as an indication of 
the relative automaticity or fluency of the relevant dimensions of the stimuli used (even 
when the tasks are equated on relative difficulty).  Here, it is important to note that to 
accept this view, one must also accept the idea that processing different dimensions of a 
stimulus (e.g., processing the Physical or Symbolic dimensions) can be achieved with 
different efficiency and speed despite being equated on a behavioural response (e.g., 
responding to the Physical or Symbolic dimension).  
 Alternatively, and perhaps more parsimoniously, it could be argued simply that 
differences between the Numerical and Physical Judgement task arise solely due to task 
instructions.  In terms of control, as conceptualized by Braver et al (2007): the task 
demands would require a different emphasis of Proactive Control.  As such, instructions 
prompting an emphasis on different stimuli dimensions would mean a unique interplay 
between those task demands and the strictly stimulus based Reactive Control to the conflict 
found in the stimuli list.  By this way of thinking then, every task should produce a unique 
strategic control effect or CP effect.  This idea will be flushed out in more detail in the 
General Discussion. 
 Another interesting finding of note from Experiments 2 and 3, is that in the 
Numerical Judgement task, Symbolic Distance is additive with the CP effect.  This is a 
novel and interesting finding.  It suggests that the component process(es) associated with 
Symbolic Distance are completed in entirety prior to, or begin after the completion of, the 
impact of Cognitive Control.  According to additive factors logic (as outlined by Sternberg, 
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1969) if the effects of two processes are additive with each other, it means that one of 
those processes must be completed before the other one begins.  Alternatively, if the 
effects of two processes interact, it means that one of those processes can begin before the 
other one is completed.  Given the additive pattern observed here, although we cannot say 
which process occurs first, we can clearly conclude that whichever process does occur 
first, it is completed in its entirety before the other one begins.   
 There is a great deal of appeal to the idea that semantic processing occurs first and 
then subsequently the processes that give rise to the CP effect are engaged.  This 
explanation would certainly fit with the current trends in popular theory.  If, however, the 
CP effect has a much earlier locus than the popular accounts state, the additivity found 
here is perfectly consistent with the idea of the CP effect running to completion before 
semantic access.  What would be quite useful, then, is to disentangle these two possibilities 
with further experimentation on the nature of the CP effect. 
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Chapter 4: Experiment 4 
 The purpose of Experiment 4 is three fold.  The primary goal is to evaluate the 
extent to which there is consistency (in the form of correlations in the size of the effects 
measured) in the application of Cognitive Control across multiple conflict tasks.  For this 
reason, three tasks are included:  the Numerical Judgement variant of the Size Congruity 
task, the Physical Judgement variant of the Size Congruity task, and the Stroop task.  If 
there is consistency found between tasks, presumably due to those tasks sharing 
resources/processes, it could be due to the role of a unitary Cognitive Control module, or 
due to other shared processes.  That is, any correlation found may be due to the similar 
component processes engaged in the task prior to Cognitive Control: the same visual 
stimuli are used in the Numerical and Physical Judgement tasks.  Alternatively, it may be 
the case that the extent to which Cognitive Control is engaged will lead to a cross-task 
correlation: the Numerical Judgement task, and the Stroop task both require the subject to 
make a judgement about the less fluent dimension of the stimuli (physical size/word), 
while ignoring the more fluent dimension (semantic meaning of stimuli).  These three tasks 
then allow me to more easily interoperate a pattern of cross task correlations in which the 
Numerical Judgement task correlates with either the Physical Judgement task or the Stroop 
task. 
 Related to the primary purpose is the second goal, which is to evaluate the extent to 
which the effects measured in these three computer tasks are related to existing scales of 
cognitive engagement.  Two scales, the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ), which is 
a measure of attentional slips (Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald & Parkes, 1982), and the 
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Need for Cognition Scale (NFC), which is a measure of the extent to which subjects 
willingly engage in effortful mental activities (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) 
will be used.  Both of theses scales (although perhaps in different ways) can be thought of 
as capturing individual differences in a construct of Cognitive Control more similar to 
earlier conceptions, or to how Braver et al. (2007) have conceptualized Proactive Control.  
The question is: does the size of Congruity effects from any of the three computer tasks, or 
the difference of difference scores (the Congruity effect at a CP of .75 – the Congruity 
effect at a CP of .25) correlate with either of these measures?  If so, then earlier 
conceptions of Cognitive Control, or to how Braver et al. (2007) have conceptualized 
Proactive Control, is what is being captured in these conflict tasks.  If, however, these two 
measures do not correlate with any of the tasks, or the higher-order difference scores, then 
it is more likely that these tasks are reflecting the more recent conceptualization of 
“strategic control” or Reactive Control.  
 The third purpose of Experiment 4 is to replicate and extend the findings of 
Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 using a completely within-subjects design.  Specifically, 
this experiment provides a very powerful method to explore the complicated pattern of 
interactions between the Judgement tasks, Congruency Proportion, and Symbolic Distance 
observed in Experiments 2 and 3 within the same participants. 
Assessing Reliability using Difference Scores 
In Experiment 4, I assess reliability by correlating the Stroop effect and Size 
Congruity effect across two different points in time (e.g., Borgmann et al., 2007; Stolz et 
al., 2005).  Difference scores from the different tasks (representing the magnitude of the 
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Congruency and CP effects in each task) will be directly compared.  It should be noted 
here, that some researchers (e.g., Williams & Zimmerman, 1996) have pointed out that 
correlating difference scores can be problematic.  This is due to the fact that difference 
scores are made up of other scores which themselves may be unreliable.  Here, the 
argument is that any results from a difference score analysis may be artifactual and due to 
the inherent unreliability of the underlying component scores.  Specifically, when 
correlating difference scores, the absence of reliability may indeed indicate low reliability.  
However, it may also indicate an inability to detect reliability that is actually present 
(Williams & Zimmerman, 1996).  
I address these concerns in the present investigation in two ways.  Firstly, I do so 
by assessing the reliability of the Stroop and Size Congruity effects as a function of 
another variable (i.e., Congruency Proportion).  Here, I can focus on changes in reliability 
as a point of interest rather than the presence or absence of reliability per se.  For example, 
if the Stroop effect is reliable when CP is high but not when CP is low, it is difficult to 
argue that the lack of reliability in the latter case was due to an inability to detect a 
correlation when correlating difference scores.  Secondly, I measure the reliability of the 
component scores used in generating the difference scores, thus eliminating concerns of 
unreliable component scores. 
 The method of comparing reliabilities and correlations is unusual in Cognitive 
Psychology.  It is, however, a clear, and as outlined above, valid way to investigate 
consistency in processing.  As stated above:  if the CP manipulation elicits a response from 
a unitary attentional adjustment mechanism we would expect to see a pattern of behaviour 
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that would indicate a common influence.  If the CP manipulation elicits a response from a 
more complex set of mechanisms, there may be little consistency in CP effects across 
tasks.  This should be borne out in the consistency of the size of the task effects as 
measured by reliabilities and inter-correlations (both within and across tasks).   
Size Congruity, Stroop, and Reliability 
In order to accomplish these goals, the Size Congruity paradigm as used in 
Experiments 2 and 3 will be used.  Although the results of Experiments 2 and 3 are quite 
clear, the Size Congruity paradigm is not one of the most well understood paradigms in 
Cognitive Psychology, especially pertaining to the role of Cognitive Control in the task.  If 
the goal is to contrast the results and size of effects across a number of different tasks, it 
seems necessary to include a task, which is both popularly understood, and can serve as a 
"baseline", or at the very least an understood reference point.  To this end, a simple four 
choice manual Stroop task will be used.   
As outlined earlier, the Stroop effect is robust, and some believe it to be a hallmark 
index of automaticity (Reisberg, 1997).  Contrary to Reisberg’s view, word recognition in 
the context of the Stroop task appears open to some form of “control”.  This is typically 
demonstrated by varying the utility of the irrelevant colour word via changing the 
proportion of congruent trials. When the proportion of congruent trials increases, the 
magnitude of the Stroop effect increases (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; Logan, Zbrodoff & 
Williamson, 1984; Lowe & Mitterer, 1982). This is hypothesized to result from the 
strategic or controlled use of the colour word as a function of its utility in predicting the 
colour (but see Risko, Blais, Stolz & Besner, 2008, Schmidt et. al. 2007, Schmidt & 
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Besner, 2008). Thus, the Stroop effect can be viewed parsimoniously as emerging from 
interplay of automatic and controlled processes.   
It is key to note here that the Stroop effect is considered very widely to be the gold 
standard for investigating “strategic”, “cognitive”, or any other of a wide variety of  
controlled processing.  It is the task upon which the Botvinick, Cohen and colleagues 
models are built, and is one of the most (if not the most) studied phenomenon in cognitive 
research.  It has been used as a foundation in a huge variety of research programs with well 
in excess of 10,000 publications making use of some variant of the task. 
By investigating the reliability of the Stroop effect as a function of CP, I can assess 
the relative contribution of “automatic” and “controlled” processes to reliability.  Although 
there have been no explicit claims about the relative reliability of “automatic” and 
“controlled” processes, our working hypothesis is that “automatic” processes should yield 
reliability whereas “controlled” processes should be less likely to do so.  In the context of 
the Stroop task, Botvinick et al. (2001) have suggested that as the proportion of congruent 
trials is increased, the amount of control is reduced.  If “automatic” processes are reliable, 
we would therefore expect to find that reliability increases as the proportion of congruent 
trials increases.  
This prediction is in line with results of Borgmann et al. (2007), who reported that 
the magnitude of the Simon effect increased with increases in the proportion of congruent 
trials.  Interestingly, when the proportion of congruent trials was .25 and a reverse Simon 
effect was observed (i.e., incongruent trials responded to faster than congruent trials) this 
effect was unreliable.  This lack of reliability was contrasted with highly reliable Simon 
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effects in both a .50 and .75 congruent condition.  
In addition, previous work using the list method in Stroop has found substantial 
reliability in a low CP condition, whereas Borgmann et al. (2007) found no reliability in a 
low CP version of the Simon effect.  Given these results it seems prudent to re-assess the 
reliability of the Stroop effect in its now dominant form (i.e., with a discrete trial 
procedure) as a function of CP.  As the prior assessed list method utilizes a blocked design, 
it is possible that previous findings of reliability have arisen due to reliability in processing 
the same trial type repeatedly in sequence.  Put another way, perhaps previous findings of 
reliability of the Stoop effect at low CPs is due to the consistency of processes utilized 
going from one trial to the next.  By contrast, the discrete trial procedure is likely a better 
index of the underlying processes, as the trial sequence is random and trial sequence 
effects can be limited.  Indeed, the repetition of trial types has been shown to have an 
impact on the size of an effect, and removing complete repetitions can be thought of as a 
more pure measure of interference free from trial sequence effects (e.g., Risko, Blais, 
Stolz, & Besner, 2008).   
The oversight of assessing reliability in common cognitive tasks is not just limited 
to the Stroop task.  Reliability is standardly viewed as a fundamental psychometric 
property that needs to be determined in the measurement of any theoretically important 
psychological construct (e.g., semantic activation).  In Cognitive Psychology, however, 
empirically assessing the reliability of phenomena used to index these constructs is the 
exception rather than the rule.  This oversight is interesting in light of the fact that in some 
of the studies that have assessed reliability, the results have been less than encouraging. 
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Reliability is not found consistently in what many consider to be robust phenomena (e.g., 
Simon effect: Borgmann et al., 2007; Semantic Priming: Stolz et al., 2005; Symbolic 
Distance Effect: Maloney, Risko, Preston, Ansari, & Fugelsang, 2010).  
This suggests that a concerted effort should be made to determine which 
phenomena are (or are not) reliable and which factors might affect this reliability.  In the 
present investigation we assess the reliability of the Stroop and the Size Congruity effects 
as a function of the proportion of congruent trials.  Previous work on the reliability of the 
Stroop effect has found it to be highly reliable (Santos & Montgomery, 1962; Jensen, 
1965; Sjoberg, 1969; Uechi, 1972; Smith & Nyman, 1974; and Schubo & Hentschel, 
1978).  As noted above; however, these findings are limited to the list method presentation, 
a methodology that is now largely extinct.  There are a few studies using the modern 
discrete trial method in which the reliability of the Stroop effect has been assessed, and 
perhaps surprisingly to many, the reliability was modest (Siegrist, 1995; Strauss, Allen, 
Jorgensen, & Cramer, 2005).  In the present experiment, I assessed the Stroop effect using 
the contemporary discrete trials version.  Where this work is unique is that it assesses this 
reliability across multiple levels of CP.   
In the case of the Size Congruity paradigm, reliability has yet to be determined.  It 
would perhaps come as a surprise for many researchers and may compromise their work if 
it were found that the Numerical Judgement and/or the Physical Judgement version of this 
paradigm did not yield reliable data.  Here, as in the Stroop task, I will assess reliability 
across two levels of CP for both versions of the Size Congruity paradigm.  
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Size Congruity, Stroop, and Cross Task Correlations 
 Whatever the reliabilities are found to be in the tasks, another level of analysis 
becomes pertinent to the question of Cognitive Control.  Rarely are cognitive paradigms 
directly compared  to each other.  Because of the differing components involved in 
different cognitive paradigms, it could be argued that many of these tasks have little in 
common with each other, utilizing different underlying processes.  This would mean there 
is little reason to study the overlap between cognitive tasks with a reliability measure, as 
after the commonalities have been subtracted out, there would be no shared processes.  
One clear exception to this of course, is the process of Cognitive Control, which is widely 
believed to be active in many if not all of the popular cognitive paradigms.  If Cognitive 
Control is common to, and operates similarly across, different cognitive paradigms, then it 
should be expected that cross task reliability should be found to at least some extent.   
Additionally, assessing the relative differences between-subjects in the amount of 
control they exhibit in cognitive tasks can be informative (Kane & Engle, 2003).  For 
example, a subject with little Cognitive Control should have trouble modulating the 
influence of the irrelevant Arabic numeral in the Numerical Judgement variant of the Size 
Congruity task to the same extent that they have trouble modulating the influence of the 
irrelevant word dimension in the Stroop task.  Between task consistencies should become 
apparent to the extent that Cognitive Control is a shared resource between these tasks.    
In summary then, there should be a clear pattern of results from Experiment 4; the 
within-subjects design and large number of subjects should provide an ideal setting to 
investigate the nature of Cognitive Control.  If Cognitive Control is a central phenomenon 
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common to the resolution of conflict in a wide variety of tasks, there should be a high 
degree of inter-correlation between the 3 tasks. In addition, and critical to the present 
thesis, there should also be significant inter-correlations between the the CP change scores 
(the .75 CP condition - the .25 CP condition) for each task, and the 2 measures of cognitive 
engagement (i.e., the CFQ and NFC).  Finally, there should be a high degree of inter-
correlation between different levels of CP in the same task (e.g., Stroop at .25 and Stroop 
at .75 should correlate at least somewhat) as those two measures share many task relevant 
processes (e.g., name prink colours). 
The received view would suggest there should be reliability found at each level of 
CP, though as seen in previous work, reliability should increase with CP.  Whereas the 
above pattern of results may be what is expected by the received view of Cognitive 
Control, it has been until now an empirical question.  If a different pattern of results is 















Ninety-eight undergraduate students with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
from the University of Waterloo participated for course credit. 
General Design 
Three computer tasks were administered to each subject that participated:  The 
Stroop task, the Numerical Judgement variant of the Size Congruity paradigm, and the 
Physical Judgement variant of the Size Congruity paradigm.  Two paper and pencil tasks 
were also administered:  The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) and the Need for 
Cognition Scale (NFC).  Order always consisted of the two paper and pencil tests being 
administered first, themselves counterbalanced in order, followed by the computer tasks.  
The order of the three computer tasks was counterbalanced, with each task containing 4 
blocks of trials that were presented in random order:  Two of the blocks of trials had a CP 
of .25 and two blocks of trials had a CP of .75.   
The Size Congruity Paradigm  
Design. Each task (Numerical and Physical Judgement tasks) contained stimuli that 
varied in terms of Congruency (Congruent vs. Incongruent), Symbolic Distance (2, 4, 5, 
and 6 units) and CP (.25 congruent vs. .75 congruent).  Stimuli consisted of the numerical 
digits 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7, and were presented in Arial font sizes 58 (1.96° of visual angle) 
and 30 (1.06° of visual angle), with each of 1, 2, and 3 being presented in every possible 
combination with 5, 6 and 7 in both font sizes.  Congruency, Symbolic Distance and CP 
   
 72 
were all within-subject variables.  Trials were considered congruent when the stimulus was 
both numerically larger and physically larger (e.g., 7 and 2), and incongruent when the 
target stimulus was numerically larger but physically smaller (e.g., 7 and 2). 
Procedure. The stimuli were presented on a 17” colour monitor driven by a 
Pentium computer running E-Prime v1.1 software (Schneider et al., 2001).  The targets 
consisted of two numerals presented to the right and left of a central fixation point (+).  
The physically large numeral was presented in font size 58 and the physically small 
numeral was presented in font size 30.  Responses were collected using a standard 
QWERTY keyboard.  Subjects used the “Q” and “P” keys to make their responses. 
Mapping of stimuli to responses was counterbalanced across subjects.  The midpoint 
between the two response keys was aligned with the central fixation.  Subjects were tested 
individually in a sound attenuated room.  Instructions for the task were displayed visually 
and relayed verbally by the experimenter.  Subjects were also requested to respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible.  
Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross which was presented for a 
duration of 900 ms.  Subsequently, the numerals were presented and remained on the 
screen until a response was made.  Twenty-eight practice trials (with a CP of .50) were 
followed by four blocks of 56 experimental trials.  Trial order was determined randomly 
for each subject.   
The Stroop Task  
Design. The task consisted of trials in which the stimuli varied in terms of 
Congruency (Congruent vs. Incongruent) and CP (.25 vs. .75 congruent).  The stimuli 
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consisted of four words, red, blue, yellow, and green, presented in one of four colours: red, 
blue, yellow, and green.  Congruency and CP were within-subject variables.  Trials were 
considered "congruent" if the colour was the same as the word and "incongruent" if the 
colour was different from the word.   
Procedure. The stimuli were presented on a 17" colour monitor driven by a 
Pentium computer running E-Prime v1.1 software (Schneider et al., 2001).  Responses 
were collected using a standard QWERTY keyboard.  Subjects used the “A”, “S”, “K” and 
“L” keys to respond to the colours red, blue, yellow, and green respectively. 
 Subjects were tested individually in a sound attenuated room.  Instructions for the 
task were displayed visually, and relayed verbally by the experimenter.  Subjects were told 
to identify the colour of the word as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing one of 
the keys on the keyboard.   
 Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by a 
coloured word.  The target remained on the screen until a response was made.  This was 
followed by an inter-trial interval of 1000 ms. Sixteen practice trials (with a CP of .50) 
were followed by four blocks of 48 experimental trials.  Trial order was determined 
randomly for each subject.   
Results 
Reaction Times 
RT analysis was conducted for all trials in which the response was correct.  RTs 
were submitted to a recursive data trimming procedure (Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1994) 
using a 2.5 standard deviation cut-off in each cell resulting in 3.2% of the RT data being 
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removed. The alpha level for all statistical tests was set at .05 (two-tailed) unless otherwise 
stated (subject mean RTs and % Error data are presented in Appendix D).  
Due to the complexity of the design and the many factors included, the analyses for 
this experiment are sub-divided into three separate sections:  (1) the main Task effects and 
interactions examining the effect of CP and Congruency in the three Tasks (see Figures 8, 
9, and 10), (2) an in-depth analysis of the Size Congruity paradigm on its own, and (3) the 
reliabilities and correlations within and between the 3 Tasks (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Main Effects, RTs and Errors 
A 3 (Task) x 2 (CP) x 2 (Congruency) ANOVA on the RT data revealed a main 
effect of Task, F(2, 194) = 503, MSE = 29287, p < .001, a main effect of CP, F(1, 97) = 
5.39, MSE = 3461, p < .05, and a main effect of Congruency, F(1, 97) = 333, MSE = 5732, 
p < .001.  In all three tasks, there was a Congruency effect such that Incongruent trials 
were slower than Congruent trials.  Furthermore, in all 3 Tasks, the Congruency effect was 
smaller in the .25 CP condition than the .75 CP condition, as evidenced by the overall CP x 
Congruency interaction, F(1, 97) = 130.7, MSE = 2374, p < .001.  Additionally, the Task x 
Congruency, F(2, 194) = 86.5, MSE = 44197, p < .001, and the Task x CP x Congruency 
interactions, F(2, 194) = 14.4, MSE = 2157, p < .001, were all significant.  Here, the size of 
the Congruency effect was largest in the Stroop task, next largest in the Numerical 
Judgement task, and smallest in the Physical Judgement task.  Furthermore, the magnitude 
of the CP by Congruency interaction was largest in the Stroop task, next largest in the 
Numerical Judgement task, and smallest in the Physical Judgement task.  The Task x CP  
interaction, F (2, 194) = 1.76, MSE = 3300, p = .18, was the only interaction that was not  







Figure 8. Mean RTs and percentage error data as a function of Congruency and  CP for the 












Figure 9. Mean RTs and percentage error data as a function of Congruency and  CP for the 












Figure 10. Mean RTs and percentage error data as a function of Congruency and  CP for 
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significant. 
A 3 (Task) x 2 (CP) x 2 (Congruency) ANOVA on the Error data revealed a similar 
pattern to the RTs (with the exception of the null Task x CP interaction observed in RTs).  
Specifically there was  a main effect of Task, F(2, 194) = 36.8, MSE = 33.1, p < .001, a 
main effect of CP, F(1, 97) = 96.0, MSE = 14.5, p < .001, and a main effect of 
Congruency, F(1, 97) = 219.8, MSE = 29.7, p < .001.  Additionally, the Task x CP, F(2, 
194) = 24.1, MSE = 12.0, p < .001, Task x Congruency, F(2, 194) = 24.0, MSE = 20.6, p < 
.001, CP x Congruency, F(1, 97) = 107.4, MSE = 17.9, p < .001, and the Task x CP x 
Congruency interactions, F(2, 194) = 22.6, MSE = 15.8, p < .001, were all significant.   
Replication and Extension of the Size Congruity Paradigm 
A 2 (Congruency: Congruent vs. Incongruent) x 4 (Symbolic Distance: 2, 4, 5, and 
6 units)  x 2 (CP: .25 vs. .75 congruent) x 2 (Task: Numerical vs. Physical Judgement) 
ANOVA was conducted on mean RTs, revealing a significant four-way interaction, F (3, 
285) = 4.05, MSE = 2339, p < .01.  In the same manner of Experiments 2 and 3, the 
analysis is now decomposed by focusing on two key aspects of the data: (1) interactions 
between Congruency, CP and Task, and (2) interactions with Symbolic Distance.   
Congruency, congruency proportion and task.  Replicating Experiments 2 and 3, 
there was a three-way interaction between Congruency, CP and Task, F (1, 95) = 54.2, 
MSE = 3083, p < .001.  Here, although CP interacted with Congruency in both the 
Numerical and Physical Judgement tasks (F(1, 95) = 171.8, MSE = 3887, p < .001, and 
F(1, 97) = 33.2, MSE = 1719, p < .001, respectively), the interaction was greater for the 
Numerical than the Physical Judgement task.  Specifically, the size congruency effect 
   
 79 
(incongruent – congruent) for the Numerical Judgement task increased from 24 ms in the 
.25 CP condition, to 107 ms in the .75 CP condition, whereas for the Physical Judgement 
task the congruency effect increased from 15 ms in the .25 CP condition, to 39 ms in the 
.75 CP condition. 
Consistent with prior research, Congruency and Task also interacted, F(1, 95) = 58, 
MSE = 4788, p < .001, in that the difference between congruent and incongruent trials was 
larger for the Numerical Judgement task (mean difference = 65 ms) than the Physical 
Judgement task (mean difference = 27 ms).  In addition, the predicted two-way interaction 
between Congruency and CP was also significant, F(1, 95) = 219, MSE = 2542, p < .001, 
such that as the proportion of congruent trials increased, so too did the difference between 
RTs for congruent and incongruent trials. 
Interactions with symbolic distance.  With respect to interactions with Symbolic 
Distance, there was a three-way interaction between Symbolic Distance, Congruency and 
Task, F(3, 285) = 7.9, MSE = 1862, p < .01.  This three-way interaction was the product of 
two Symbolic Distance by Congruency interactions that take opposite forms.  Specifically, 
for the Numerical Judgement task, as Symbolic Distance increased, the size of the 
congruency effect got smaller, F (3, 285) = 3.0, MSE = 2707, p < .05, whereas for the 
Physical Judgement task, as the Symbolic Distance increased, the size of the congruency 
effect got larger, F (3, 291) = 4.5, MSE = 1335,  p < .05. 
There was also a two-way interaction between Symbolic Distance and Task, F(3, 
285) = 44.4, MSE = 2546, p < .001, as well as main effects of Congruency, F(1, 95) = 296, 
MSE = 5577, p < .001, Symbolic Distance, F(3, 285) = 13.4, MSE = 2347, p < .001, and 
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Task, F(1, 95) = 281.7, MSE = 21623, p < .001.  No other main effects or interactions were 
significant (largest F = 1.95).  
Errors 
An analogous 2 (Congruency: Congruent vs. Incongruent) x 4 (Symbolic Distance: 
2, 4, 5, and 6 units) x 2 (CP: .25 vs. .75 congruent) x 2 (Task: Numerical vs. Physical 
Judgement) ANOVA was conducted on mean errors, revealing a significant four-way 
interaction, F (3, 291) = 8.0, MSE = 48.1, p < .001.  As with the RT analyses, these data 
are now decomposed by focusing on two key aspects of the data: (1) interactions between 
Congruency, CP and Task, and (2) interactions with Symbolic Distance.   
Congruency, congruency proportion and task.  Consistent with the RT analyses, 
and most important given our predictions, there was a three-way interaction between 
Congruency, CP and Task, F(1, 97) = 39.3, MSE = 66, p < .001.  This three way 
interaction was the product of two 2-way interactions that took opposite forms.  That is, 
although CP interacted with Congruency in both the Numerical and Physical Judgement 
tasks (F(1, 97) = 90, MSE = 101.2, p < .001, and F(1, 97) = 13.6, MSE = 40.99, p < .001, 
respectively),  the interaction was overadditive  for the Numerical Judgement task and 
underadditive for the Physical Judgement task.  Specifically, the size congruency effect 
(incongruent – congruent) for the Numerical Judgement task increased from 2.1% errors in 
the .25 CP condition, to 11.6% errors in the .75 CP condition, whereas for the Physical 
Judgement task the congruency effect actually decreased  from 3.6% errors in the .25 CP 
condition, to 1.2% errors in the .75 CP condition. 
Consistent with the RT analysis, Congruency and Task also interacted, F(1, 97) = 
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46.8, MSE = 80.1, p < .001, in that the difference between congruent and incongruent trials 
was larger for the Numerical Judgement task (mean difference = 6.8 % errors) than the 
Physical Judgement task (mean difference = 2.5 % errors).  In addition, the predicted two-
way interaction between Congruency and CP was also significant, F(1, 97) = 93.4, MSE = 
76.1, p < .001 , such that as the proportion of congruent trials increased, so too did the 
difference between errors for congruent and incongruent trials. 
Interactions with symbolic distance. With respect to interactions with Symbolic 
Distance, there was a three-way interaction between Symbolic Distance, Congruency and 
Task, F (3, 291) = 8.1, MSE = 54.2, p < .01.  Like the RT analysis, this three-way 
interaction was the product of two Symbolic Distance by Congruency interactions that take 
opposite forms.  Specifically, for the Numerical Judgement task, as Symbolic Distance 
increased, the size of the congruency effect got smaller, F (3, 285) = 4.7, MSE = 61.3, p < 
.01, whereas for the Physical Judgement task, as the Symbolic Distance increased, the size 
of the congruency effect got larger, F (3, 291) = 3.8, MSE = 31.0,  p < .05. 
There was also a two-way interaction between Symbolic Distance and Task, F(3, 
291) = 18.6, MSE = 49.7, p < .001, as well as main effects of Congruency, F(1, 97) = 158, 
MSE = 108.7, p < .001, and Task, F(1, 97) = 19.9, MSE = 2159, p < .001. No other main 
effects or interactions were significant (largest F = 2.1).  
Interim Summary (RTs and Errors) 
The expected effects and patterns of data regarding the relation between CP and 
Congruency were found in all tasks.  Specifically, in each Task, as the proportion of 
congruent trials increased, so too did the size of the congruency effect.  In addition, 
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regarding the Size Congruity paradigm, I replicated the asymmetry found in Experiments 2 
and 3, whereby the CP manipulation differentially modulated the Congruency effect in the 
Numerical and Physical Judgement tasks.  Specifically, in both RTs and errors, the 
Congruency by CP interaction was larger in the Numerical Judgement task than the 
Physical Judgement task. These findings are key, as they now allow us to examine the 
reliabilities, and cross correlations, between Tasks.   
Additionally, as found in Experiments 2 and 3, the Symbolic Distance effect for the 
Numerical Judgement task was additive with the CP effect.  This null is particularly 
interesting as it is a further replication under conditions in which even a marginal 
interaction should be apparent.  I will reserve discussion of these findings to the General 
Discussion 
Reliabilities and Correlations 
 As a preliminary first step when interpreting the reliabilities and correlations of 
difference scores, it is necessary to first look at the component scores' reliabilities to 
ensure that there are no limitations to looking at the reliabilities derived from the 
difference of these components (Williams & Zimmerman, 1996).  The entire set of task 
correlations are presented in Appendix F, and the scatterplots depicting task reliabilities 
are presented in Appendix G.  None of the component scores were unreliable, and only 
one was uncorrelated with any of the other component scores (i.e., Stroop .25 / Congruent 
Block 1 with Numerical 25 / Incongruent Block 1 was uncorrelated).  Indeed, the lowest 
component score reliability was .67.  The difference score reliabilities (i.e., reliabilities of 
congruency effects) and inter-correlations within and between tasks are presented in Table 
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1.  The difference of difference scores, or the CP score (e.g., the .75 CP difference score - 
.25 CP congruent difference score) inter-correlations are presented in Table 2. 
 All correlations presented were subjected to an outlier procedure in which 
studentized residuals were calculated and any value exceeding 3.5 was not included in the 
analysis (but is included in the scatterplot as a circled point).  It should be noted that in all 
cases, probably due to the large number of subjects, the inclusion or exclusion of outliers 
made no significant difference in the strengths of the correlations or the significance of the 
correlations.  The scatterplots are displayed in appendices G - K inclusive and are divided 
into the following categories (in which order they will also be further discussed):  
Reliability (test-retest correlations), within task cross CP, cross task within CP, cross task 
cross CP, and finally CP change inter-correlations and correlations with Need for 
Cognition and Cognitive Failures Questionnaires. 
Reliability 
 All three tasks were reliable at both levels of CP (see Table 1, and Appendix G for 
the scatterplots).  As has been found in the past (e.g., Borgmann et al., 2007), the general 
trend for higher reliability with higher CPs was found with all three tasks having 
reliabilities in the low .50 range for the .75 CP conditions, and between .33 and .45 for the 
.25 CP conditions.  It has been pointed out before that reliabilities for common cognitive 
phenomenon are often lower than many might expect (see Borgmann et al., 2007; Stolz et 
al., 2005).  This is indeed surprising given that the cognitive tasks they are taken from are 
so robust.  The current data do show significant reliability, but may surprise many  
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researchers that they are not higher, even with a substantial number of subjects.  This is 
suggestive that we take for granted the robustness and replicability of many cognitive 
phenomenon.  It is important that we do not overlook the fact that there is still 
considerable variance in the measurement of these phenomenon. 
Within Task, Cross Congruency Proportion  
 The correlations for Cross CP within the same task, is in essence, a test of the 
degree to which, at different CPs, performance on a task is consistent.  Not too 
surprisingly, all three tasks showed at least some consistency across CPs (see Table 1, and 
Appendix H for the scatterplots).  The Physical Judgement task and Stroop tasks were both 
fairly consistent across CPs, with correlations of .50 and .51 respectively (both significant 
at p < .01).  The Numerical Judgement task was less consistent across CPs with a 
correlation of .25 (p < .05).   
Cross Task, Within Congruency Proportion 
 Perhaps the strongest test of a central top-down Cognitive Control account of CP 
effects is the test of consistency of the CP manipulations across tasks.  As these data were 
collected via a within-subjects methodology, the level of consistency between 
performance here is suggestive of the level of shared processing across tasks.  If there is a 
single mechanism giving rise to CP effects, we would expect to see a large degree of 
consistency for all 6 comparisons (i.e., Numerical Judgement task at .25 with Physical 
Judgement task at .25, Numerical Judgement task at .25 with Stroop task at .25, Physical 
Judgement task at .25 with Stroop task at .25, Numerical Judgement task at .75 with 
Physical Judgement task at .75, Numerical Judgement task at .75 with Stroop task at .75, 
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and Physical Judgement task at .75 with Stroop task at .75).   
 What is striking here is that there is no consistent pattern of correlations (these data 
are depicted in Table 1 and Appendix I).  There are three correlations that are significant: 
Numerical Judgement task at .25 and Stroop task at .25 (r(96)  = -.23, p < .05), Physical 
Judgement task at .25 and Stroop task at .25 (r(96)  = .29, p < .01), Numerical Judgement 
task at .75 and Stroop task at .75 (r(96)  =.33, p < .05).  The other three correlations are all 
very small and non-significant.  Additionally, the first significant correlation (Numerical 
Judgement task at .25 and Stroop task at .25) is in the negative direction!   
Cross Task, Cross Congruency Proportion 
 The final set of six correlations form the remainder of Table 1 (see Appendix J for 
the scatterplots).  Of these correlations, only one is significant:  the Physical Judgement 
task at .75 and the Stroop task at .25 (r(96) = .21, p < .05). 
Congruency Proportion Change Scores and Cognitive Control Scales 
 The final set of correlations examined is the CP change scores (the .75 CP 
condition – the .25 CP condition) and the Cognitive Control scales (NFC and CFQ).  
These correlations would also seem to be central to the question of the role of Cognitive 
Control in producing CP effects, as the change scores should be consistent with each other 
(correlated) if they are produced by a single unitary control mechanism.  In addition, the 
NFC and CFQ scales should correlate with these scores as they are thought to index 
central aspects of Cognitive Control.  Interestingly, none of these scores correlate (see 
Table 2 and Appendix K for the scatterplots).   
This null effect really encompasses two separate findings.  The first is that the NFC 
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and CFQ do not correlate with the CP change scores.  The second is that there is no inter-
correlation between the tasks in the CP change scores.  One explanation for these nulls is 
that the underlying component scores (here the inter-correlations presented in Table 1) are 
not sufficiently high to detect these higher order correlations.  This interpretation loses 
lustre though when considering that the NFC and CFQ did not correlate with any of the 
three tasks which did show significant reliability.  The upper limits of any detectable 
correlation may have been moderate, but was theoretically well within the limits of the 
component scores statistical utility.  The more theoretically interesting explanation is that 
these measures did not correlate because they measure different things. 
Summary 
 The reliabilities of the component scores and difference scores follow the expected 
pattern; that is, all of the component scores were reliable and as the proportion of 
congruent trials increased, so to did the reliability of the difference scores.  The pattern of 
inter-correlations, however, is more difficult to interpret.  Specifically, whereas there were 
at least modest inter-correlations between different CPs of the same task, there was only 
one between tasks.  In the cases in which CP was the same across tasks, only half of the 
correlations were significant, and one of those three significant correlations was negative.  
To unpack this pattern more completely, there are a total of 12 correlations between the 
three tasks, generated from the different combinations of the 3 tasks at both levels of CP.  
Six of the twelve correlations are cross task, same CP (e.g., Stroop at .25 and Physical 
Judgement task at .25) and six are cross task, different CP (e.g., Stroop at .25 and Physical 
Judgement task at .75).  Of the former group, half of the correlations are non-existent/not-
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significant, one was negative (Numerical Judgement task at .25 and Stroop at .25) and two 
were significant but low (Numerical Judgement task at .75 and Stroop at .75, and Physical 
Judgement task at .25 and Stroop at .25).  Of the latter six, only the Physical Judgement 
task at .75 and Stroop at .25 correlated.  The other five correlations were all remarkably 
close to zero.  In sum, three of a possible twelve correlations were positive and significant. 
This pattern of data is hard to reconcile with an account of CP that is thought to derive 
from a central and unitary Cognitive Control mechanism. 
Exploratory Factor Analyses of Control Components 
 As a post-hoc exploratory analysis, a number of Factor Analysis models were 
tested (see Appendix L for the models).  Of the five models tested, none of them were a 
“good” fit (a Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of .9 is generally considered acceptable).  
However, rank ordering them from best fit to worst offers an interesting insight that fits 
with the above correlational analyses.  The best fit model tested was a stimulus driven 
model in which the type of stimulus loaded onto the 6 conditions (three tasks at two CPs 
each).  The next best fit model was similar, but had a “Cognitive Control” factor (which 
was simply a single predictor at a higher level than the stimulus level predictors) 
associated with the three task/stimulus types.  The CFI was .74 for the first model and .68 
for the second model.  The next three models tested the factors high and low congruency, 
and “Cognitive Control” alone and in combination.  All three models had a CFI of .33 or 
worse.  As such, the single best predictor of this set of within-subject data then was the 
stimuli/task used.  More importantly, a central (or unitary) high level process actually 
worsened the model’s ability to predict this data set.  Not only is there no evidence for a 
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role for a unitary Cognitive Control module in these tasks, there is evidence against a role 
for a unitary Cognitive Control module. 
 The correlational analysis and Factor Analysis models seem to point in a common 
direction; the best method of explaining the variance of CP effects is to look at the task 
specific qualities (or stimuli used).  These data, then, seem to fit better with an account of 
CP effects that has a larger role for memory and attention than a role for a singular account 
of Cognitive Control.  In short, an explanation for CP effects based on earlier attentional 
factors fits much better to these data.  
 The first and perhaps most obvious finding in the correlational analysis, then, is that 
there is little shared variance between tasks.  The largest correlations were found within 
task, with the .25 CP correlating with the .75 CP for each task.  This finding may not be 
surprising at all, but is nonetheless a vital clue given the lack of correlations elsewhere.  
These three correlations dovetail nicely with the Factor Analysis in which the “best” fitting 
model was one in which task specific factors drive the pattern of data seen.  Succinctly 
then, those factors which are shared within task (stimuli, task instructions, task context) are 
of central importance in understanding the CP effects seen here.   
 The correlations that would be most important to the idea of a central top-down 
Cognitive Control mechanism shared across tasks are the Cross Task / Within CP 
correlations (Appendix I).  Of these six correlations, three were insignificant, one was 
negative, and only two were significant and positive.  As to a specific explanation for this 
pattern of correlations, the imagination is left wanting for a parsimonious account.  Just as 
it is easy to imagine that the similarities in the processes shared by the same task lead to 
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the correlations between the .75 CP and .25 CP versions of each task, so too could it be 
that similarities in processes between tasks give rise to inter task correlations.  If the 
similarities in tasks are not ubiquitous (and therefore seemingly related to a central 
component of all the tasks), then finding the particular similarity between specific tasks 
may be more difficult.  It could be, for example, that the shared direction of conflict in the 
.75 CP Numerical Judgement and Stroop tasks is what leads to a correlation there.  By this 
explanation, the fact that the more fluent process (physical size assessment / word reading) 
is interfering with a less fluent process (number meaning / colour identification) would be 
important.  This, however, would not explain why the Numerical and Stroop tasks then 
negatively correlate at the .25 CP.  Nor would it explain the correlation between the .25 CP 
conditions of the Physical Judgement task and the Stroop task.  
 An additional observation that bears on Cognitive Control is the higher order 
difference scores, or the difference between levels of CP across task.  If the tasks share the 
same mechanism of control that gives rise to the CP effect, then it would be expected that 
these scores would correlate.  The CP effects were uncorrelated across tasks, however, as 
noted above, this higher order comparison should be viewed critically, as unlike the 
correlation of component scores or the correlation of difference scores, the reliabilities of 
the .25 CP condition (which themselves are based on reliable scores) for all three tasks 
were moderate at best.  This places a theoretical boundary on the size of any subsequent 
correlations between difference scores.  So, although the difference scores may be of 
interest, the difference of difference scores should be viewed with caution.  This caution 
seems pertinent as in other cases, the lack of a correlation in one condition is offset by the 
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finding of a correlation in another, and thus, the lack of a correlation cannot be due to an 
inability to find a correlation that really exists.  This is not the case in the difference of 
difference scores, as no correlations at this level of analysis were significant.  
 Finally, the two scales that purportedly index key aspects of Cognitive Control (i.e., 
the CFQ and NFC scale) were poorly correlated with any of the measures of CP.  These 
two scales offer important insights into the nature of the relation between Cognitive 
Control and CP effects as they each represent an independent measure of Cognitive 
Control.  Specifically, the CFQ is thought to be a measure of the degree to which an 
individual experiences slips of attention (or loss of control), whereas the NFC is thought to 
be a measure of the extent to which an individual willfully engages (tries to apply 
Cognitive Control) when engaged in a task.  The lack of a correlation here with CP effects 
suggest that any form of Cognitive Control (or “strategic” influences) engaged in these 
tasks that give rise to the CP effect are separate and distinct from these measures of 
Cognitive Control.  Further, if there is a mechanism engaged in the production of CP 
effects, it would seem to be task specific, and does not reflect a construct related to earlier 
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
The findings reported in this thesis significantly extend prior research that has 
employed CP manipulations to uncover key aspects of Cognitive Control in conflict tasks.  
Previous studies using CP manipulations in different paradigms have produced results 
similar to those of the current study.  In Stroop (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; Logan, Zbrodoff 
& Williamson, 1984; Lowe & Mitterer, 1982), Simon (Hommel, 1994; Sturmer, Leuthold, 
Soetens, Schröter & Sommer, 2002), and Flanker studies (Gratton, Coles & Donchin, 
1992), the common finding is that as the proportion of congruent/compatible trials 
increases, so too does the magnitude of the effect being studied.  Importantly, this thesis 
extends this prior work in two important ways.  First, I demonstrated that participants’ 
conscious awareness of their performance in these types of experiments is quite limited.  
Subject's self report of their experience doing the task (Experiment 1), their engagement 
with the task (NFC, Experiment 4), and their propensity to have attentional slips (CFQ, 
Experiment 4) did not predict their performance in any way.  Secondly, in three 
experiments, I was able to demonstrate that a CP manipulation in one task is completely 
distinct from a CP manipulation in a different task.  I was able to show this in both a 
between-subjects design when all the stimuli and the context of the experiment were 
identical.  I was also able to demonstrate this in a within-subjects design.  This set of 
experiments has undermined the received view that CP effects arise from a central and 
unitary form of conscious control. 
 Botvinick et al. (2001) have explained CP manipulation effects in terms of a 
reduction in the amount of attentional control required as the proportion of congruent trials 
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increases.  That is, when there is a high proportion of trials that are congruent, the odds are 
that on any given trial the irrelevant dimension will provide the same response as the 
relevant dimension.  By contrast, when the proportion of congruent trials is low, more 
often than not the subject will be presented with conflicting information from the relevant 
and irrelevant dimensions.  Thus, the proportion of congruent trials moderates the amount 
of conflict in the task and thus the attentional demands on the subject.  The reduction of 
attentional control in the high CP condition allows the contribution of more “automatic” or 
highly fluent processes to have an increased influence over performance.  This increase in 
reliance on more putatively automatic processes then, leads to faster processing of 
congruent trials and much slower processing of incongruent trials.  In the current tasks, 
Botvinick et al.’s (2001) account can be applied to explain the CP effects seen for each 
task, but has no recourse to explain the differences between tasks, or the lack of correlation 
between tasks.   
 By contrast, Melara and Algom (2003) produce a CP effect in their model via a 
short-term memory mechanism.  More specifically, as noted in the introduction, Melara 
and Algom posit that short-term memory (or recent events), in which proportion 
information is encoded along with contextual information, interacts with task demands.  
Recent data seem to fit better with the Melara and Algom (2003) model than the Botvinick 
et al. (2001) model.  For example, Jacoby and colleagues (Jacoby et al, 2003; Bugg et al, 
2008) have demonstrated that there are a number of item specific effects that can be shown 
to produce separate CP effects, while maintaining a global or list level of proportion.  They 
suggest that, although it may be possible to explain all the list level effects as a function of 
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the individual component item specific effects, within each of these individual component 
item specific effects there are multiple levels of control.  The problem with this account is 
with how far it could be taken.  If, for example, you design a Stroop experiment and assign 
half the items one proportion and half another, and then further have two fonts for each of 
these proportions, each font with its own CP, could you not then distinguish within each 
level of font some third method for splitting the proportion of trials?  How many separate 
levels of control are possible?  As it seems that each of the contingencies between the 
dimensions of the different stimuli interact uniquely (see Schmidt & Besner, 2008), there 
may be no limit to the number of unique ways in which a potentially unlimited number of 
dimensions of stimuli could co-vary in different proportions to each other.  The conception 
of levels of control loses its value rather rapidly.   
 The current data make clear that these numerous CP effects are distinct from each 
other.  One of the novel findings of Experiment 2, Experiment 3, and  Experiment 4 is that 
even with identical stimuli, task instructions can lead to asymmetrical CP effects.  This is 
further evidence that CP effects are highly dependent on specific and minimal factors.  
Although this finding is not sufficient in itself to suggest that the theory presented by 
Botvinick et al (2001) is wrong, it does suggest that their account, as it is currently 
specified, is insufficient.  The correlational data from Experiment 4 is more difficult to 
reconcile with the Botvinick et al. (2001) account.  Here, the quantitative differences in CP 
effects from contextual manipulations, different item contingencies, and (as in 
Experiments 2, 3, and 4) task instruction, are suggestive of a far more intricate factor at 
play in producing these effects. This is not to say that there is no role for an error detector 
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as posited by Botvinick and colleagues, but rather to say that such a detector cannot 
explain all CP effects.  An error detector may be a completely viable mechanism to explain 
how Cognitive Control is modulated in tasks following the commission of an error.  It 
might well be the case that an error detector is engaged when a subject makes an error, and 
then Cognitive Control is increased to reduce the likelihood of an error on a subsequent 
trial.  This example is a completely different event from a correct response being made on 
a trial in which the accuracy and response time to that trial is determined by previous 
experience with the task.    
 Whereas the current data combined with the recent research mentioned above is not 
consistent with the notion of a single Cognitive Control mechanism, it is at least somewhat 
consistent with a memory account such as proposed in Melara and Algom’s (2003) model.  
The strength of this model is that all of the CP effects from contextual manipulations, 
different item contingencies, or task instruction can be accounted for by the same 
parsimonious mechanism.  There is, however, one further key piece of the picture that 
needs to be considered: the novel finding reported here in three experiments that a 
manipulation of the proportion of congruent trials has no effect on the Symbolic Distance 
effect.  How does this additive pattern of data fit if CP effects are indeed due to a memory 
mechanism?   At issue is the fact that the Symbolic Distance effect has its locus in long-
term memory.  Whereas the basic structure of Melara and Algom’s (2003) model is 
straight forward, the way in which memory interacts with task demands is relatively 
complex.  Short-term memory in Melara and Algom’s (2003) model is a separate and 
distinct implemented mechanism; it is this mechanism that gives rise to the CP effects. 
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What may not be immediately apparent, however, is that they are agnostic on the relative 
role of short-term memory in representations of stored information in long-term memory.  
Specifically, they make no argument as to whether short-term memory is a separate 
component of memory or a subset of long-term memory.  Their model theoretically is 
consistent with both possibilities.  What is clear in their model is that the contents of short-
term memory have a direct influence on the ease with which long-term memory is 
accessed.  In their account, it is the “relative dimensional uncertainty” between stimulus 
dimensions (i.e., the CP) that dictates the ease of access to the long-term memory 
component of the model.  As the dimensional uncertainty rises (CP decreases) the 
difficulty in accessing representations in long-term memory that correspond with the 
current stimuli increases.   
What might the additive relation between CP and Symbolic Distance observed in 
Experiments 2, 3, and 4 entail for models of CP effects?  By applying additive factors logic 
(Sternberg, 1969) it would seem clear that the mechanism(s) that give(s) rise to the CP 
effects do not occur during, or in conjunction with, the mechanism(s) that give(s) rise to 
the Symbolic Distance effect.  Rather, the factors that give rise to the Symbolic Distance 
effect must occur separately from the factors that give rise to the CP effect.  With the 
Symbolic Distance effect taken as a measure of semantic access (to long-term memory) in 
the Numerical Judgement task, it then follows that the CP effect has its locus prior to, or 
following, semantic access.  This result then could be at odds with the Melara and Algom 
(2003) model.  Specifically, if the CP effect arises from short-term memory, and if short-
term memory is a subset of long-term memory, and the Symbolic Distance effect is 
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presumably a function of access to long-term memory, it would seem likely that CP 
manipulations would have an impact on the Symbolic Distance effect.  Certainly Symbolic 
Distance interacted with the effect of Congruency in the Numerical and Physical 
Judgement task.   
There are two ready explanations as to why it may be that CP and Symbolic 
Distance do not interact.  The most obvious is that there is some degree of separation 
between short-term memory and long-term memory, and possibly that they are completely 
independent from each other as memory stores (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968).  This 
explanation would fit with the Melara and Algom (2003) model as it stands, as presumably 
the Symbolic Distance effect arising from long-term memory and, the CP effect arising 
from short-term memory do not interact.  Alternatively though, some researchers have 
argued that memory is comprised of a single store.  For example, Kwantes (2005) uses an 
implemented model of semantic effects derived from a lexicon that illustrates that more 
than one memory “effect”  (both Lexical memory and Semantic memory) can be generated 
from a single memory store.  By this second view, short-term memory, long-term memory, 
and semantic memory are part of a single store.  This second view would seem inconsistent 
with Melara and Algom’s implemented model. 
 One further piece of evidence worth considering is that the CFQ and NFC scales do 
not correlate with the CP effect.  As noted previously, these scales are claimed to capture 
different aspects of conscious engagement.  Specifically, the CFQ is thought to capture the 
involuntary slips in control, and the NFC is thought to capture the willful desire to engage 
control.  If the scales correlated with the CP effect, it could have been argued that the 
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influence of control has a late locus, after semantic access.  Additionally, it could be 
argued that the CP effect was generated from a central conscious locus. That these 
measures do not speak to the CP effect undermines the idea of conscious volitional control 
playing a role in the production of the CP effect.  It seems more likely that the locus of the 
CP effect occurs early, or alternatively, that the CP effect has very little to do with 
Cognitive Control as classically defined.   
 Dovetailing nicely with the results of the CFQ and NFC scales, Experiment 1 lends 
credibility to the idea that conscious control is not engaged in producing the CP effect.  
Although subjects’ estimates of the proportion of congruent trials correlated with the actual 
CP, they only did so when analyzing across the two CPs.  Subject's estimates of the 
proportion of congruent trials had no predictive value on their actual performance within a 
given CP.  This suggests that certainly there is some seepage, as in retrospect, subjects can 
gain a vague sense of the actual CP, albeit a widely inaccurate one.  However, it absolutely 
does not fit with a notion of a conscious online effort to maximize performance with a 
strategy.  Indeed, the word strategy seems entirely out of place.  Given this, where then 
does the CP effect arise from? 
 A single memory store account would seem to require that CP effects arise early 
(i.e., via short-term memory).  Both the Botvinick et al (2001) model, and the Melara and 
Algom (2003) model exert Cognitive Control late for the purpose of response selection.  
Botvinick et al (2001) also generate the CP effect from the adjustment of this control.  
Melara and Algom (2003) generate the CP via an earlier influence in the form of a short-
term memory module.  The data here seem to suggest that whereas Cognitive Control may 
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indeed be active for setting up task demands/responses, it plays no role in producing CP 
effects.  The data also suggest, however, that CP effects do not arise from short-term 
memory influencing long-term memory.  What is left is an account in which short-term 
memory (as a separate store, or as a subset of the active components of long-term memory) 
influences the attention to the target stimuli.  Short-term memory records the sum of recent 
trials and the responses given to those trials.  On each given trial, short-term memory 
influences the attentional weight to the separate components of the stimuli.  CP effects do 
not have their locus in short-term memory, but rather arise because the contents of short-
term memory influence attention.  In a high CP condition, the irrelevant dimension is 
highly correlated with the relevant dimension, and when they both provide the correct 
response, performance is speeded.  On incongruent trials, the irrelevant dimension 
provides evidence for one response that has in the past been correct, while the relevant 
dimension still provides the correct response.  The result is a more difficult response 
selection as two opposing responses are highly salient, and response time is longer.  In a 
low CP condition, the irrelevant dimension is poorly correlated with the relevant 
dimension (or negatively correlated in the case of a set of two stimuli), and when they both 
provide the correct response, performance is speeded.  However, on incongruent trials the 
irrelevant dimension has less of an impact as recent trials have not raised the saliency of 
any of the distractors.  In the special case of a low CP condition with a stimuli set of two 
(for example, a Stroop task with Red and Blue), the irrelevant dimension actually gains 
saliency such that the “incorrect” meaning of the irrelevant dimension predicts the correct 
response.  Thus, simply identifying the separate components of the stimuli that have utility 
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in producing the correct response (they are predictive) is sufficient to produce CP effects.   
Conclusion 
 Interestingly, the empirical evidence may suggest that the title of Cognitive Control 
be restricted to earlier conceptions in which control is considered to likely be conscious, 
driven by task demands/context, and individual approaches to a task.  Certainly, the current 
literature and current data point to a potentially infinite level of complexity in our ability to 
discriminate between different aspects of a stimulus.  The current data could be explained 
via recourse to positing the existence of separate control mechanisms, or separate 
implementations of the same control mechanism for each task.  As each subject would then 
need at minimum three different sets of control for the three tasks used here, it is not 
difficult then to argue that explaining the current data in terms of separate control 
mechanisms has the same shortcomings as an account with multiple levels of control.   
Cognitive Control then really may be limited to that which we have “direct 
introspective awareness” of, and “subjective feelings of control” (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977).  The complex pattern of data that arises from CP manipulations across tasks can be 
reduced to as simple and elegant an explanation as our incredible ability for implicit 
learning.  Certainly there is a role for the concept of Cognitive Control in many facets of 
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Appendix A 
Subject Mean RTs, Errors, and Estimates for Experiment 1
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Experiment 1 Mean RT for congruent and incongruent trials in Block 1 and Block 2
CP Incong Blck 1 Cong Blck 1 Incong Blck 2 Cong Blck 2
25 365 385 389 398
25 475 511 408 515
25 440 445 443 459
25 444 478 423 472
25 579 631 574 594
25 340 389 334 363
25 401 427 395 404
25 399 468 397 471
25 488 510 509 549
25 338 362 328 394
25 441 453 416 476
25 406 428 399 455
25 597 652 507 476
25 384 443 388 432
25 544 539 452 502
25 454 459 435 471
25 440 528 448 522
25 465 524 421 455
25 367 373 384 397
25 412 441 420 468
25 457 522 414 462
25 425 428 387 396
25 425 471 453 446
25 440 453 445 464
25 429 434 423 435
25 386 383 400 401
25 403 410 446 466
25 397 424 403 424
25 388 441 409 415
25 381 388 377 389
25 393 452 380 422
25 420 434 496 549
25 429 423 464 488
25 399 404 367 406
25 368 411 384 438
25 353 381 343 378
25 451 478 448 500
75 422 411 429 422
75 354 348 388 363
75 380 363 420 368
75 478 443 560 472
75 443 389 405 386
75 422 391 466 400
75 363 330 391 348
75 372 331 384 336
75 427 419 442 400
75 389 342 411 360
75 477 421 475 408
75 486 399 522 449
75 390 342 426 378
75 303 296 314 300
75 407 350 386 373
75 334 314 358 292
75 442 398 422 404
75 450 342 415 340
75 512 452 537 461
75 465 435 500 458
75 472 441 477 419
75 424 405 447 402
75 411 355 405 361
75 395 348 405 330
75 432 358 384 342
75 580 470 569 454
75 464 405 461 374
75 540 432 481 380
75 439 404 448 435
75 430 363 421 346
75 458 439 510 450
75 350 307 374 309
75 460 387 419 394
75 513 467 498 447
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Experiment 1 Mean % Error for congruent and incongruent trials in Block 1 and Block 2
CP Incong Blck 1 Cong Blck 1 Incong Blck 2 Cong Blck 2
25 1 17 1 7
25 2 7 2 3
25 6 7 7 13
25 0 7 3 0
25 1 3 0 4
25 0 37 4 27
25 6 13 9 11
25 0 3 2 13
25 3 11 4 17
25 2 13 4 17
25 1 7 4 20
25 0 10 0 13
25 3 12 5 11
25 3 10 2 7
25 5 17 3 11
25 3 0 2 10
25 0 3 0 13
25 2 13 4 14
25 10 13 4 23
25 0 7 0 7
25 2 7 3 17
25 1 7 2 7
25 1 10 6 0
25 0 3 2 0
25 5 3 3 3
25 0 13 4 7
25 2 3 4 14
25 1 7 1 3
25 4 0 2 14
25 2 3 6 13
25 3 10 3 7
25 4 3 1 11
25 12 17 18 17
25 3 3 4 10
25 6 10 0 17
25 0 7 0 3
25 2 0 2 3
75 17 1 17 4
75 13 1 7 4
75 17 4 7 7
75 21 2 14 5
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75 7 0 0 0
75 10 1 7 2
75 10 3 3 0
75 20 4 3 1
75 7 0 7 0
75 10 2 7 2
75 7 1 17 2
75 3 1 7 1
75 13 2 17 0
75 47 8 37 4
75 10 0 10 0
75 13 3 27 7
75 3 2 7 2
75 20 2 37 2
75 13 1 7 1
75 3 0 0 0
75 20 0 10 2
75 30 3 31 3
75 3 1 10 0
75 20 1 13 1
75 0 0 7 0
75 4 1 10 0
75 3 1 10 1
75 15 1 27 3
75 7 2 14 1
75 3 0 7 0
75 10 0 17 1
75 13 0 17 3
75 17 1 17 1
75 14 2 20 2
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Experiment 1 Subject estimations of CP 
CP Guess Confidence Uesful
25 70 60 No
25 50 80 No
25 30 50 No
25 60 80 Yes
25 60 70 No
25 66 75 Yes
25 50 30 Yes
25 65 65 Yes
25 40 60 No
25 68 70 No
25 50 80 Yes
25 50 60 No
25 60 70 Yes
25 30 20 Yes
25 60 40 Yes
25 50 40 No
25 30 60 No
25 40 80 Yes
25 50 20 No
25 30 5 No
25 20 70 No
25 35 50 No
25 40 20 No
25 65 10 No
25 40 30 Yes
25 30 20 Yes
25 50 86 No
25 40 10 No
25 50 70 Yes
25 60 70 No
25 35 70 No
25 40 40 Yes
25 50 60 Yes
25 60 50 No
25 20 80 Yes
25 50 10 No
25 25 40 Yes
75 70 60 Yes
75 60 60 Yes
75 70 60 Yes
75 70 60 Yes
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75 60 60 No
75 60 60 Yes
75 70 50 Yes
75 70 60 Yes
75 30 60 No
75 75 90 No
75 75 60 Yes
75 50 50 Yes
75 75 60 Yes
75 85 90 No
75 75 80 No
75 80 70 Yes
75 70 50 Yes
75 75 50 Yes
75 80 80 Yes
75 80 70 Yes
75 75 80 Yes
75 75 70 Yes
75 65 70 Yes
75 75 70 No
75 80 80 Yes
75 75 95 Yes
75 65 70 Yes
75 50 40 No
75 70 90 Yes
75 50 60 Yes
75 60 60 Yes
75 75 70 Yes
75 70 60 Yes
75 75 75 Yes
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Appendix B
Subject Mean RTs and Errors for Experiment 2
CP
Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong
25 559 521 582 537 556 524 550 495 528 485
25 644 614 549 521 549 539 566 541 559 560
25 371 357 368 372 378 359 358 357 386 366
25 438 407 477 412 444 418 475 425 436 403
25 658 626 592 581 579 567 555 524 540 642
25 602 649 542 645 546 654 562 585 544 494
25 412 444 416 423 415 408 411 419 393 377
25 494 427 487 432 494 440 483 438 452 420
25 501 576 488 542 473 504 477 454 430 441
25 498 467 462 448 456 448 453 452 456 449
25 524 539 487 539 508 482 522 493 476 493
25 490 457 502 479 489 485 495 441 473 456
25 420 338 404 386 400 368 419 401 380 402
25 758 713 711 704 684 647 694 694 613 592
25 592 456 548 593 559 519 577 648 492 509
25 538 519 488 462 491 465 480 464 444 465
25 422 405 438 375 426 356 426 362 393 392
25 461 442 483 412 458 403 461 390 470 399
25 600 581 607 541 572 543 581 496 557 627
50 667 567 656 589 626 505 608 560 615 528
50 575 409 541 450 494 430 515 466 543 414
50 437 384 418 377 426 367 385 344 404 367
50 418 408 424 379 426 388 414 391 422 387
50 563 576 538 520 527 475 536 530 525 461
50 470 421 489 441 490 452 488 435 476 445
50 484 423 463 441 462 432 487 428 444 478
50 540 498 556 501 551 536 520 535 510 489
50 559 505 580 511 558 506 589 515 582 501
50 559 486 534 472 567 449 500 490 523 453
50 834 777 825 719 821 754 803 709 708 734
50 665 577 608 535 592 515 590 526 544 563
50 516 392 508 408 435 393 441 417 455 360
50 468 416 441 402 443 382 479 391 463 356
50 514 425 458 410 458 398 436 414 420 436
50 524 425 498 429 536 485 529 442 468 470
50 556 535 571 492 540 493 575 478 492 495
50 378 341 387 337 383 338 378 340 375 366
75 662 604 750 583 649 559 629 551 712 531
75 614 428 542 435 521 447 533 445 525 406
75 601 453 515 453 530 469 500 490 511 435
75 525 523 560 518 548 519 562 496 717 489
75 720 467 713 487 584 463 610 456 579 431
75 486 423 473 391 486 401 476 391 465 397
75 355 355 307 366 451 364 418 368 451 323
75 470 440 484 429 498 398 475 385 533 392
75 602 423 492 434 498 416 524 418 420 404
75 509 441 498 470 536 460 500 446 542 468
75 595 440 566 500 572 518 514 476 503 443
75 497 435 577 463 533 430 528 419 512 443
75 522 493 519 440 499 461 474 436 459 410
75 862 658 739 621 740 656 664 652 657 670
75 539 549 593 515 583 556 564 525 668 547
75 583 532 602 428 619 420 597 422 535 393
75 409 354 493 337 410 344 390 342 463 343
75 439 390 468 351 456 356 442 372 419 357
Experiment 2: Numerical Task Subject Mean Rts
Distance of 2 Distance of 3 Distance of 4 Distance of 5 Distance of 6
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CP
Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong
25 361 353 378 348 385 395 382 352 382 365
25 492 458 484 416 472 452 498 458 457 501
25 358 337 361 336 356 323 354 336 352 372
25 297 299 295 291 296 295 288 302 321 277
25 344 440 354 361 360 364 365 387 372 348
25 360 370 385 372 375 357 373 366 368 382
25 489 443 458 445 465 443 474 442 480 475
25 355 404 357 366 370 352 362 362 375 370
25 348 353 328 339 322 334 352 350 369 359
25 378 408 369 370 369 386 377 397 387 348
25 380 354 359 411 372 360 395 337 373 399
25 354 354 351 359 348 354 358 314 370 339
25 391 348 343 360 352 347 348 374 341 350
25 337 370 341 305 331 312 329 318 323 310
25 375 402 384 363 384 352 361 352 400 402
25 350 328 322 329 319 346 332 312 391 290
25 306 340 313 332 321 350 323 298 331 309
50 401 379 389 377 375 391 383 373 346 379
50 377 376 370 352 356 362 353 372 351 385
50 357 352 345 335 355 354 366 358 377 353
50 464 429 449 495 530 442 450 459 436 437
50 503 460 493 477 465 476 452 483 463 491
50 368 345 376 364 368 370 377 368 400 376
50 405 391 369 383 377 381 366 383 397 385
50 376 364 371 368 334 330 351 360 349 346
50 379 381 381 362 373 373 391 358 394 361
50 393 348 365 357 344 368 366 364 372 346
50 391 385 408 409 378 396 431 411 419 393
50 398 406 405 393 418 387 385 409 449 450
50 420 418 436 418 442 439 451 467 436 476
50 358 325 373 352 387 356 357 351 363 363
50 464 484 497 436 461 447 470 535 519 510
50 448 493 474 427 428 418 442 445 457 429
50 456 476 482 453 454 453 452 461 553 435
75 363 309 313 324 328 318 328 318 328 311
75 292 332 339 329 335 318 307 315 341 328
75 430 386 401 406 383 370 402 409 386 394
75 381 411 415 383 382 380 380 396 408 365
75 307 310 312 324 314 310 341 303 310 314
75 327 308 344 334 310 321 318 315 361 314
75 467 460 489 469 503 479 473 490 508 476
75 439 526 454 471 460 463 538 456 520 468
75 385 355 353 351 373 371 388 365 384 365
75 290 315 328 326 307 323 320 318 250 306
75 379 378 415 363 440 369 402 374 566 358
75 362 379 420 373 467 361 466 362 374 386
75 351 334 462 357 380 365 363 353 390 344
75 358 378 369 366 385 378 441 379 369 371
75 395 314 357 337 350 343 358 342 379 337
75 477 451 417 448 475 447 452 456 481 430
75 381 368 372 344 334 357 375 371 401 363
75 391 359 385 375 394 373 392 384 391 376
75 424 409 426 411 459 402 470 416 438 414
Experiment 2: Physicall Task Subject Mean Rts
Distance of 2 Distance of 3 Distance of 4 Distance of 5 Distance of 6
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CP
Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong
25 6 0 0 8 9 0 0 0 6 0
25 6 0 3 0 0 6 3 0 0 0
25 0 0 3 8 4 6 9 18 18 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 12 0 0 8 2 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 7 6 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 3 0 2 0 3 9 0 0
25 6 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 6 0 0 0 3 0 6 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 8 6 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 6 0
25 6 0 0 0 2 0 8 0 6 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
50 0 0 8 0 3 0 9 0 8 9
50 8 0 4 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 8 0 3 0 0 0 0 8
50 0 0 4 0 6 0 4 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0
50 0 8 4 0 3 3 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 8 0 4 8 9 0
50 0 0 0 4 6 0 4 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 8 0 4 0 11 0 0 4 0 0
50 17 0 4 0 9 0 0 4 8 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 4 0 3 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 12 0 6 0 8 0 17 0
75 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
75 0 0 0 6 18 0 17 0 0 0
75 0 0 0 0 17 0 8 0 17 0
75 0 0 0 0 17 2 8 3 0 0
75 0 0 25 0 18 0 0 0 17 0
75 0 0 17 0 11 0 0 0 0 0
75 17 11 73 23 28 17 33 19 50 11
75 17 0 18 0 11 0 0 0 0 0
75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75 33 0 31 0 32 0 23 2 25 0
75 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0
75 17 0 8 0 6 2 0 0 0 0
75 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75 0 6 9 0 0 0 8 0 0 0
75 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 6
75 0 0 18 0 11 0 8 0 0 0
75 17 6 33 0 6 0 8 0 17 0
75 17 0 8 0 17 0 17 0 0 0
Experiment 2: Numerical Task Subject Mean Errors
Distance of 2 Distance of 3 Distance of 4 Distance of 5 Distance of 6
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CP
Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 8 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 6 0
25 9 8 10 0 7 6 1 4 6 8
25 6 0 3 0 4 0 0 8 6 0
25 0 0 3 8 2 0 0 0 0 0
25 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 6 0
25 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 2 6 0 0 0 17
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0
25 6 0 0 9 0 0 0 9 0 0
25 6 0 0 0 2 0 3 20 0 0
25 6 0 3 8 18 6 0 0 12 0
25 6 0 3 17 8 6 6 8 0 0
25 6 17 11 18 19 23 20 8 11 50
25 0 0 0 0 4 6 6 25 0 0
50 0 0 4 8 0 0 4 0 0 8
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 8 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 8 0 0 0 6 6 13 4 9 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 17 8 6 3 4 0 0 0
50 0 8 0 4 0 6 0 4 0 0
50 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 25 0
50 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 4 0 6 3 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 4 3 3 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75 0 6 0 0 11 2 8 0 0 0
75 17 6 0 6 0 4 8 18 33 11
75 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 6
75 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 0 0 0
75 0 6 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0
75 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 3 0 0
75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 0
75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75 0 0 9 0 6 2 8 0 0 0
75 0 11 8 3 6 6 8 3 67 6
75 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 17 0
75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
75 0 0 0 3 11 2 8 0 17 6
75 0 0 0 9 11 0 0 3 17 18
75 0 6 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
75 0 0 17 3 12 0 8 0 0 6
75 0 0 17 3 0 0 0 0 17 0
75 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 17 0
Experiment 2: Physical Task Subject Mean Errors
Distance of 2 Distance of 3 Distance of 4 Distance of 5 Distance of 6
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Appendix C
Subject Mean RTs and Errors for Experiment 3
CP
Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong
25 633 565 600 536 582 487
25 536 552 490 471 478 434
25 577 515 541 483 527 479
25 522 486 446 415 430 408
25 610 578 635 507 535 491
25 549 602 532 565 505 485
25 663 708 619 575 505 534
25 494 469 450 442 430 415
25 745 708 620 554 581 496
25 528 435 437 371 409 402
25 505 486 455 437 440 432
25 606 549 555 536 547 541
25 721 744 682 673 645 625
25 602 529 541 451 492 431
25 581 521 563 486 521 499
25 675 651 615 541 584 558
25 535 519 472 411 452 409
75 672 536 607 518 568 490
75 599 453 530 408 523 388
75 633 572 713 460 588 467
75 571 525 561 499 532 478
75 653 632 638 556 666 537
75 555 401 456 405 400 375
75 526 423 496 397 464 386
75 595 493 557 464 526 447
75 738 626 679 558 628 544
75 511 449 480 430 447 408
75 539 468 505 420 471 409
75 762 562 637 534 591 504
75 577 517 556 487 513 477
75 710 456 549 419 522 409
75 665 544 592 478 528 472
75 749 660 683 597 659 572
75 547 462 518 438 478 429
Experiment 3: Numerical Task Subject Mean Rts
Distance of 1 Distance of 3 Distance of 5
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CP
Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong
25 399 405 402 388 411 401
25 479 483 504 417 547 409
25 537 588 516 452 737 528
25 543 564 529 530 543 504
25 404 434 416 396 421 408
25 549 538 502 483 544 479
25 446 427 450 423 438 432
25 497 492 505 445 519 495
25 372 379 402 356 382 382
25 418 383 414 387 425 406
25 470 450 468 453 468 470
25 1151 938 1049 898 1159 940
25 492 437 457 439 487 421
25 431 445 439 424 450 384
25 512 503 485 523 506 489
25 605 601 601 581 602 602
75 594 664 664 573 683 586
75 509 425 458 402 457 393
75 706 615 550 656 689 605
75 467 452 591 468 641 465
75 479 474 618 445 526 437
75 432 426 503 431 443 427
75 508 457 539 461 542 445
75 620 556 619 548 587 569
75 550 464 549 443 579 435
75 561 543 585 561 578 543
75 639 583 743 568 708 594
75 531 442 504 447 524 411
75 404 399 413 409 424 407
75 443 422 466 436 475 426
75 435 407 450 407 458 398
75 538 453 499 436 519 442
75 432 400 455 396 438 373
75 403 381 439 395 407 377
75 401 393 410 404 421 390
Experiment 3: Physical Task Subject Mean Rts
Distance of 1 Distance of 3 Distance of 5
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CP
Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong
25 8 0 4 0 4 0
25 8 8 1 0 1 0
25 6 0 5 2 2 0
25 9 10 5 2 1 0
25 12 0 3 0 1 0
25 6 10 1 2 2 0
25 19 15 7 8 3 13
25 10 6 4 0 1 0
25 4 0 1 0 0 0
25 17 2 3 2 5 0
25 1 2 0 0 0 0
25 18 10 6 0 1 0
25 8 2 2 2 1 0
25 13 0 5 0 0 0
25 3 0 7 0 0 0
25 8 0 1 0 1 0
25 17 0 6 0 3 0
75 4 0 0 0 0 0
75 48 5 23 1 13 0
75 27 4 4 1 6 2
75 10 4 8 3 4 1
75 15 2 10 3 4 1
75 40 3 25 3 13 3
75 23 1 4 1 2 0
75 23 1 10 1 8 1
75 13 0 6 0 4 1
75 10 1 0 1 2 0
75 8 0 8 1 4 0
75 27 1 17 0 8 0
75 13 0 4 0 2 0
75 40 1 17 1 13 0
75 17 3 2 1 2 1
75 15 2 8 1 0 0
75 21 2 10 1 2 1
Experiment 3: Numerical Task Subject Mean Errors
Distance of 1 Distance of 3 Distance of 5
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CP
Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong
25 15 0 8 2 4 0
25 6 0 10 0 8 2
25 16 0 10 0 11 0
25 9 0 8 0 7 0
25 12 0 10 0 8 0
25 10 0 10 0 8 0
25 17 0 9 0 11 0
25 19 0 12 0 8 0
25 14 2 13 0 14 4
25 6 2 6 0 13 4
25 13 0 9 0 10 0
25 4 4 4 6 6 4
25 9 0 15 0 9 0
25 17 0 8 2 10 0
25 13 0 10 0 11 0
25 11 0 10 0 10 0
75 8 0 10 0 6 0
75 6 0 2 0 0 0
75 8 0 4 0 8 1
75 17 0 8 0 21 0
75 6 0 15 0 8 0
75 8 0 8 0 10 0
75 17 0 13 0 8 0
75 25 0 8 0 6 0
75 6 0 6 0 13 0
75 8 0 13 0 2 0
75 17 0 13 0 6 0
75 13 0 8 0 6 1
75 10 0 4 1 8 0
75 10 0 13 0 4 0
75 2 0 19 1 8 0
75 13 0 4 1 13 0
75 8 0 4 0 6 1
75 4 1 13 1 6 0
75 15 0 8 0 8 0
Experiment 3: Physical Task Subject Mean Errors
Distance of 1 Distance of 3 Distance of 5
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Appendix D
Subject Mean RTs and Errors for Experiment 4
Experiment 4 Mean RT for Numerical, Physical, and Stroop tasks at 25% and 75% congruent
Task
CP
Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong
398 408 426 381 363 338 385 310 640 496 678 545
485 498 495 457 426 437 437 417 750 652 795 711
532 553 633 461 414 464 399 378 848 764 954 657
517 402 408 336 327 316 341 313 443 451 453 421
501 436 554 448 488 403 390 399 943 772 1361 948
504 473 686 423 393 384 456 352 1018 1024 1589 750
445 457 481 370 370 370 391 354 765 704 573 591
504 455 582 413 385 391 394 384 1429 1370 1582 1069
425 408 612 349 346 339 321 322 684 637 703 529
405 365 429 382 365 344 374 373 699 623 713 568
513 525 496 453 432 435 471 417 821 667 859 762
460 441 504 393 371 357 373 344 643 600 687 605
395 379 483 366 281 284 313 308 726 900 718 573
633 624 655 519 369 375 373 375 1161 776 1246 775
503 461 509 411 460 441 456 411 1131 1005 965 871
401 400 430 343 321 317 327 328 786 581 773 615
439 508 465 394 346 318 365 341 931 620 879 649
503 522 588 433 402 372 364 346 1165 857 1264 892
379 339 375 320 305 346 271 284 624 622 581 550
432 356 537 359 310 301 360 309 1009 661 1261 738
457 481 523 420 359 341 435 364 758 658 924 700
518 480 559 462 357 345 344 332 630 618 657 646
556 529 560 486 484 506 506 450 817 781 976 683
381 316 376 320 316 326 303 312 591 561 588 501
510 424 570 385 359 352 334 345 876 718 1074 688
451 404 522 404 386 369 371 345 744 586 829 614
662 621 752 625 460 468 412 420 947 786 882 764
450 419 484 391 405 407 439 387 905 759 1002 703
471 411 496 403 359 354 369 352 658 597 858 628
507 530 567 460 421 384 376 354 845 589 861 559
399 335 403 322 309 294 309 290 466 444 406 428
361 348 394 290 314 330 324 293 683 505 737 563
513 472 598 416 326 322 320 309 684 706 799 627
396 381 409 383 328 341 376 322 668 672 874 614
491 474 483 462 337 315 315 313 703 583 781 640
401 368 450 357 340 328 375 329 725 627 784 541
362 334 422 325 287 284 273 272 563 477 606 463
430 423 451 348 346 334 334 331 1046 969 1245 837
464 382 501 387 369 366 375 362 750 732 954 585
480 426 430 417 440 421 563 437 785 595 652 560
386 372 411 359 319 322 311 309 474 439 466 470
468 506 543 423 444 396 501 390 1179 802 1245 755
413 384 443 382 330 324 307 300 564 535 671 515
512 479 567 419 402 399 399 392 1132 1090 1064 836
572 513 633 479 371 366 367 358 872 712 951 636
392 370 392 350 339 337 357 328 615 503 749 528
473 455 617 468 352 349 358 339 561 573 590 610
25 75
Numerical Physical Stroop
25 75 25 75
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440 417 492 377 443 381 408 361 813 801 648 692
396 350 473 331 316 302 345 311 609 509 614 452
451 445 485 400 410 392 401 373 916 721 959 639
381 352 443 338 296 286 315 302 543 600 498 502
422 418 473 412 368 331 432 385 818 710 746 704
589 556 561 457 400 429 411 397 850 889 999 738
419 366 480 322 348 325 409 319 568 488 608 488
478 445 541 398 399 348 403 353 973 772 830 659
657 559 718 573 513 486 540 390 813 686 873 594
517 543 462 413 352 346 362 344 964 878 887 882
497 503 503 421 441 407 538 424 863 759 1016 916
467 403 492 377 367 358 392 352 1080 620 1111 629
482 430 552 387 351 340 408 353 878 603 1015 624
660 565 804 506 445 417 529 442 924 708 1145 1190
571 475 647 428 350 353 350 338 615 563 809 531
621 672 772 610 489 448 447 432 1236 922 982 739
465 419 593 414 373 373 406 372 840 835 858 764
408 400 490 404 404 378 480 377 906 782 1081 777
392 363 471 371 359 332 350 329 560 488 558 476
554 503 580 465 398 435 443 388 808 641 987 659
514 469 567 461 339 321 326 325 575 498 674 528
543 530 527 467 400 366 412 360 577 654 706 577
486 467 494 421 348 349 413 354 710 520 768 586
579 529 581 520 484 430 500 430 857 672 919 683
492 452 474 395 390 376 477 406 716 677 764 576
596 637 683 555 595 492 572 419 878 672 916 913
441 414 492 364 343 339 338 326 633 497 572 502
463 436 561 407 524 373 515 381 818 547 815 605
503 483 579 478 398 385 372 363 766 776 1002 832
415 454 442 388 326 329 328 295 574 525 711 499
432 415 454 390 543 481 533 397 866 757 1037 647
437 458 463 401 350 333 368 369 660 591 612 527
450 405 599 434 427 451 439 441 790 707 958 758
426 354 409 358 363 345 347 309 565 513 655 581
438 494 491 403 342 330 366 366 639 561 637 516
437 487 483 444 338 307 341 332 1082 862 1113 934
460 460 522 380 396 379 375 354 797 752 872 772
485 433 531 422 417 384 468 382 780 694 809 678
399 422 427 349 318 319 318 315 546 507 581 450
477 500 573 479 416 419 434 390 821 679 1019 812
438 382 455 372 336 332 339 329 497 560 603 593
421 383 468 393 368 364 380 344 815 734 867 729
461 448 481 407 331 342 380 350 679 650 792 679
428 373 462 389 311 305 305 300 920 1014 903 815
468 490 556 391 392 369 350 340 895 636 901 633
457 451 443 382 427 396 572 386 874 885 671 718
569 527 574 495 405 401 435 410 858 745 1142 693
491 392 543 412 409 368 511 352 686 584 702 592
487 447 802 404 422 410 411 396 1060 816 912 652
408 376 464 362 359 340 357 334 640 564 502 513
468 481 549 416 352 349 366 334 881 894 1059 762
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Experiment 4 Mean% Errors for Numerical, Physical, and Stroop tasks at 25% and 75% congruent
Task
CP
Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong
4 4 7 2 8 0 4 4 13 9 21 4
0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0
1 0 7 0 0 0 4 1 4 4 17 3
12 0 19 4 11 0 4 0 6 5 14 10
0 0 12 1 0 0 4 0 3 0 8 0
6 4 19 0 5 4 7 2 7 0 4 1
9 0 23 5 11 4 7 6 14 13 23 16
1 0 4 0 3 0 0 1 6 0 0 0
14 11 48 0 4 0 8 4 10 8 22 12
2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 4 1
1 0 4 1 1 0 7 0 11 8 4 0
1 4 11 0 1 0 4 0 3 4 17 3
3 0 18 1 18 21 14 13 15 17 17 10
2 11 21 0 4 7 4 6 18 13 17 8
1 4 4 2 6 0 11 1 8 8 4 3
11 0 27 1 10 4 4 2 6 0 13 1
3 0 26 0 4 0 11 1 4 0 4 0
4 0 19 1 4 4 15 4 20 0 13 7
10 7 22 8 10 15 19 16 14 8 30 6
10 4 37 1 3 7 0 0 13 0 8 0
1 0 7 0 1 7 4 0 10 13 30 4
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 0 3
1 0 4 0 0 4 7 0 22 21 29 1
8 0 19 0 6 4 11 1 9 9 22 6
6 0 18 1 1 8 4 2 7 0 22 1
6 0 19 0 8 0 7 1 4 0 17 1
5 0 0 0 4 7 4 4 3 4 4 0
4 0 26 0 0 0 7 0 7 0 13 1
2 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 4 6
1 4 7 2 5 4 8 1 9 0 0 0
14 0 32 0 7 4 11 6 25 21 33 33
13 0 21 1 4 0 11 5 16 0 21 1
5 8 18 0 1 0 0 2 6 13 4 6
1 0 4 2 6 0 4 1 11 0 17 3
2 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 8 4
1 0 7 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 4 1
7 4 31 0 8 7 19 2 11 0 4 10
6 0 29 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 8 1
1 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 8 0
10 22 41 4 5 4 29 9 7 14 8 6
5 0 15 1 0 0 4 0 7 4 0 3
1 0 4 0 6 0 11 2 4 0 0 0
4 0 11 0 3 7 15 2 13 21 21 12
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 9 0 1
2 0 8 0 0 4 0 0 3 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0
1 0 11 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6
25 75
Numerical Physical Stroop
25 75 25 75
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2 0 7 0 0 0 4 1 6 0 5 4
1 0 4 0 1 0 4 0 10 0 17 1
4 0 4 0 1 0 0 1 18 4 21 4
6 0 22 1 1 0 7 0 7 4 0 9
0 0 8 1 1 0 11 1 6 4 0 7
7 4 30 5 4 7 4 3 7 13 8 3
1 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 8 0 9 3
2 0 22 0 5 0 7 1 6 0 9 6
5 0 8 1 5 0 0 3 4 4 0 4
1 4 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 3
0 0 4 1 1 0 14 1 1 0 9 4
5 0 19 0 1 0 0 4 6 0 10 0
5 4 14 1 4 0 8 2 9 0 4 0
6 4 11 0 0 0 8 0 3 0 9 4
9 0 15 1 4 0 0 0 6 8 8 4
5 0 11 1 8 0 7 1 6 9 26 0
0 0 11 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 4 0 3 0 4 0
2 0 4 1 4 4 11 0 13 0 8 1
4 0 0 1 1 0 4 0 3 0 17 2
2 0 4 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 4 0
1 4 0 0 1 0 7 0 3 4 0 3
3 0 15 0 0 0 4 1 4 4 17 4
1 0 8 0 0 0 11 1 3 0 4 0
0 0 4 0 1 0 4 0 3 8 4 0
1 4 8 0 4 0 7 0 3 9 9 0
6 0 14 1 3 0 0 2 13 0 0 4
0 0 4 1 1 4 4 1 4 5 0 3
0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 4 0
4 4 21 0 6 4 4 3 10 0 29 3
4 4 11 2 11 14 19 3 27 4 33 12
1 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 4 4 13 6
0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 6
6 4 16 0 5 0 11 2 14 14 21 9
3 0 14 0 1 0 0 1 4 0 9 2
0 4 4 0 4 0 7 1 1 5 4 1
4 0 8 0 1 4 4 2 7 4 19 8
0 0 7 0 2 0 7 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
5 4 4 2 1 0 7 0 7 5 17 6
2 0 18 0 1 0 4 1 6 9 13 3
1 0 8 0 4 4 0 0 6 0 8 1
1 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 17 3
4 0 19 1 2 4 4 0 6 8 9 1
4 0 21 0 2 0 0 0 14 0 17 0
4 4 18 0 4 0 4 2 14 17 9 9
0 0 12 0 2 0 0 0 9 0 13 0
3 0 7 0 4 0 7 0 1 9 8 8
7 7 44 8 4 0 4 3 16 0 23 10
2 0 7 1 0 0 7 0 1 0 5 4
1 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 13 0
128
Appendix E
Subject Difference Scores for Experiment 4
Experiment 4: Difference in Proportion effects (in ms, 75%-25%) and survey scores
Numerical Physical Stroop CFQ NFC
56 56 -8 39 56
49 32 -22 42 62
194 72 212 49 48
-36 18 39 35 44
46 -94 243 41 54
231 94 842 54 48
123 39 -62 17 45
122 16 453 61 42
247 -9 112 31 43
9 -18 64 25 50
59 58 -52 40 57
89 16 38 24 47
100 5 303 41 53
127 7 90 76 62
56 24 -31 40 53
87 -5 -41 27 63
140 -3 -82 44 60
176 -12 76 46 55
15 35 33 63 45
100 45 176 48 54
128 56 132 52 66
59 1 -1 49 54
51 84 278 63 47
-8 2 60 43 43
98 -17 235 45 55
67 9 57 44 52
86 4 -43 44 62
63 53 160 53 52
31 12 178 36 46
129 -17 47 53 52
11 4 -22 47 53
92 46 3 28 61
138 7 198 36 39
14 66 266 38 35
10 -21 22 65 29
59 35 143 58 52
68 -2 61 24 57
97 -10 330 67 42
33 12 359 26 52
-42 111 -100 81 44
42 6 -39 16 36
161 63 118 23 58
35 2 131 41 66
113 4 190 39 46
95 7 144 24 43
20 28 112 41 23
132 19 -9 23 50
92 -14 -55 51 42
129
97 20 51 61 55
80 9 136 61 47
74 4 56 58 50
57 12 -69 63 65
71 38 316 20 47
106 68 40 33 41
112 -1 -15 22 44
53 125 151 61 60
76 12 -84 34 59
88 88 -4 41 54
53 31 11 51 50
114 46 119 52 55
215 60 -256 60 35
124 14 229 54 47
207 -37 -46 62 41
136 35 87 36 45
80 75 182 38 41
71 -7 8 33 48
66 91 154 58 44
61 -17 72 51 46
47 20 206 46 51
52 62 5 47 36
10 16 51 36 55
40 57 154 43 40
177 50 -198 56 42
101 7 -67 47 39
118 -13 -65 52 49
80 -6 179 54 58
94 36 156 43 52
47 76 286 46 41
83 -18 28 49 43
119 23 117 30 60
-21 20 6 52 36
145 -14 42 31 65
85 -22 -66 43 44
144 5 60 59 50
55 60 51 13 50
101 3 95 38 59
117 48 35 32 42
27 5 73 41 49
38 32 57 19 60
64 42 80 49 46
20 -2 186 43 38
200 -14 13 28 49
56 156 -22 59 52
38 22 312 41 62
27 120 9 41 36
323 2 30 55 43
69 5 -88 29 50
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Scatterplots Depicting Cross Task / Cross Congruency Proportion Relations
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Numerical 25 Physical 75
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Scatterplots Depicting Relations between CP Difference Scores and NFC and CFQ scales
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NFC and CFQ
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Numerical and Stroop 
Difference scores
N = 96 r = -.07 p >.05
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Difference scores
N = 97 r = -.08 p >.05











































Physical and Stroop 
Difference scores
N = 97 r = .04 p >.05































































































































































































Chi2 (9) = 26.58, p < .001 ; CFI = 0.738
.39
.62
.55
.88
.55
.80
.65
.30
.77
.30
.38
.15
Numerical
Task
Physical
Task
Stroop
Task
-.09
-.03
.34
